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Honorable Daniel S. Goldin
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Dear Mr. Goldin:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) is pleased to submit its annual report
covering the period from February 1994 through January 1995. Overall, the Panel
uncovered no "show stoppers" related to safety which is indicative of NASA's continuing
commitment to risk management and reduction.
NASA's programs made significant advances during the past year. We are particularly
pleased that all of the components of the Block II Space Shuttle Main Engine modifica-
tions are now underway and making good progress. Nevertheless, the safety impact of
severe budget cutbacks and the departures of key personnel, particularly on labor-inten-
sive operations such as Space Shuttle processing, continue to warrant the Panel's attention.
We remain concerned about the effective implementation of the joint U.S./Russian safety
requirements. It has been difficult for us to obtain the timely and in-depth information
needed to become comfortable in our oversight role of these programs. We will continue
to follow the NASA collaboration with the Russians in the year to come with the specific
goal of obtaining a better understanding of the joint safety processes.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel appreciates the support received from NASA and
its contractors. We are also grateful for NASA's timely response to last year's report.
This permitted us to pursue open items in an expeditious manner. As in the past, we ask
that you respond only to Section II, "Findings and Recommendations," of the current
submission.
Very truly yours,
Norman R. Parmet
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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I. INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION
NASA continued its safe and productive space
and aeronautics programs over the past year in
spite of budget cutbacks and political uncer-
tainties. Seven successful Space Shuttle mis-
sions added significant knowledge in science
and technology and on the ability of humans to
adapt to space. These flights included the
repair of the Hubble Space Telescope and also
laid the groundwork for rendezvous and dock-
ing with the Russian Mir Space Station. The
Langley Research Center completed its work
on the joint NASA/Federal Aviation
Administration wind shear detection program.
The results were rapidly transferred to safety
improvements throughout the world. The
International Space Station (ISS) began to take
shape during the year as designs matured and
the cooperative agreements with the Russian
Space Agency and its contractors were clari-
fied. In all, it was a year of significant incre-
mental accomplishments, progress on long-
term programs and, most importantly, safe air-
craft and spacecraft operations.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP) monitored NASA's activities
and provided feedback to the NASA
Administrator, other NASA officials and the
Congress throughout the year. Particular
attention was paid to the Space Shuttle, its
launch processing and planned and potential
safety improvements. The Panel monitored
Space Shuttle processing at the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) and will continue to fol-
low it as personnel reductions are implement-
ed. There is particular concern that upgrades
in hardware, software and operations with the
potential for significant risk reduction not be
overlooked due to the extraordinary budget
pressures facing the agency. The authoriza-
tion of all of the Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME) Block II components portends future
Space Shuttle operations at lower risk levels
and with greater margins for handling
unplanned ascent events. On the other hand,
delaying the incorporation of Global
Positioning System (GPS) capability in the
Orbiter represents a significant lost opportu-
nity for safety enhancements.
Throughout the year, the Panel attempted to
monitor the safety activities related to the
Russian involvement in both space and aero-
nautics programs. This proved difficult as the
working relationships between NASA and the
Russians were still being defined as the year
unfolded. NASA's concern for the unique
safety problems inherent in a multi-national
endeavor appears appropriate. Actions are
underway or contemplated which should be
capable of identifying and rectifying problem
areas. The Panel will monitor the joint
NASA/Russian effort closely in the upcoming
year. Particular emphasis will be placed on the
potential for an increase in launch schedule
pressure as the Shuttle/Mir missions begin.
NASA must renew efforts to resist pressures to
assign a launch schedule priority so high that
safety may be compromised.
In the coming year, the ASAP will extend and
adapt its oversight activities as needed to cover
the new and revised safety challenges inherent
in the continued U.S. leadership in aeronautics
and the expanded habitation of space by
humans.
During the year, Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired
as a Panel member and became a consultant to
the ASAE Ms. Yvonne C. Brill was appointed
as a member of the Panel. Mr. Paul M.
Johnstone, a member of the Panel, was made
deputy chairman and chairman designate.
The balance of this report presents "Findings
and Recommendations" (Section II),
"Information in Support of Findings and
Recommendations" (Section III) and
Appendices describing Panel membership, the
NASA response to the March 1994 ASAP
report and a chronology of the Panel's activi-
ties during the reporting period (Section IV).
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II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION PROGRAM
Finding #1
The original organization of the International
Space Station (ISS) Program included an inde-
pendent safety assessment function reporting
directly to the Program Manager.Subsequently,
this was changed so that independent assess-
ment reported directly to the Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission
Assurance.
Recommendation #1
Maintain the true independence of the safety
assessment function by ensuring that it reports
outside the Space Station Program.
Finding #2
The ISS Program has committed to providing
an assured crew return capability. This will ini-
tially be accomplished by using a combination
of docked Space Shuttles and Soyuz capsules.
Once the ISS is permanently and fully staffed,
a newly designed Assured Crew Return
Vehicle (ACRV) will be deployed.
Recommendation #2
The use of the Space Shuttle and Soyuz as an
interim measure is an expedient. The planned
new ACRV is definitely needed to support
safety in the long term. The design of this per-
manent ACRV, regardless of where and when
it is built, should be consistent with the design
reference missions and systems requirements
previously defined by the ACRV Office of the
Space Station Freedom.
Finding #3
The architecture of the ISS contains a Caution
and Warning (C&W) system to detect and
warn of malfunctions and emergencies, includ-
ing toxic spills, depressurization and fire. The
system makes use of laptop computers for
localization of faults.
Recommendation #3
Careful consideration should be given to the
appropriateness of using laptop computers for
a task as time critical as localizing life-threat-
ening emergencies. The entire fault detection
and localization process should use dedicated
equipment to minimize response time.
Finding #4
The absence of experimental data for fire sup-
pression effectiveness of the carbon dioxide
extinguishers selected lbr use on the ISS under
weightless conditions is a source of concern.
Recommendation #4
Appropriate ground-based and in-flight
research to confirm the suitability of the use of
pressurized carbon dioxide fire extinguishers
under weightlessness should be conducted.
Finding #5
The present procedures for monitoring or con-
trolling hazardous materials and procedures
used in ISS experiments are dependent on the
experiment supplier complying with Station
requirements and specifications.
Recommendation #5
NASA should establish a positive system of
compliance assurance modeled after the one
used by the Space Shuttle Program. This sys-
tem should consider the entire service life of
the experiment and its deactivation when
completed.
Finding #6
Good progress has been made in defining the
threat from orbital debris and in demonstrating
efficient shielding configurations. A technical
basis for a debris protection specification for
ISS is emerging.
Recommendation #6
Continue design with emphasis on: structural
integrity of habitable modules and pressure
vessels; identification of the damage potential
from direct impact and other depressurization
events; and definition and development of
operational procedures and policies.
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B. SHUTTLE/MIR (PHASE ONE) PROGRAM
Finding #7
The Russian Androgynous Peripheral Docking
System (APDS) for docking the Space Shuttle
with the Mir uses 12 active hooks on the Space
Shuttle side which mate with an equal number
of passive hooks on the Mir. The design cur-
rently provides no positive means of determin-
ing whether any or all of the hooks are
secured. NASA has decided it is an acceptable
risk to fly the first docking mission, STS-71,
without an indicator.
Recommendation #7
NASA should develop an indicator system.
Finding #8
If the primary system fails, the first backup
separation system for the APDS is a set of pyro
bolts which disengage the 12 active hooks.
Having to rely on the pyros as presently sup-
plied by the Russian Space Agency poses risk
because of lack of knowledge relating to the
pyros' pedigree and certification. A second
contingency demate procedure is available
involving the Extravehicular Activity (EVA)
removal of 96 bolts at a different interface.
Implementing either backup method to sepa-
rate Shuttle from Mir may leave the Mir port
unusable for future dockings.
Recommendation #8
NASA should emphasize increasing the relia-
bility of the primary mating/demating mecha-
nisms in order to reduce the likelihood of hav-
ing to use either of the backups. NASA should
also obtain an acceptable certification of the
supplied pyro bolts. Failing that, NASA should
procure fully certified substitute bolts.
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C. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
ORBITER
Finding #9
Significant additional payload mass capability
is required to meet the demands of the ISS
assembly and supply plans. Much of the need-
ed increase in capacity will be achieved
through weight reduction programs on a num-
ber of Space Shuttle elements and subsystems.
The large number of simultaneous changes
creates potential tracking and communication
problems among system managers.
Recommendation #9
Emphasis should be placed on the adequate
integration of all of the changes into the total
system.
Finding #10
The New Gas Generator Valve Module
(NGGVM), when certified and retrofitted to
the fleet, should mitigate many of the prob-
lems with the current Improved Gas Generator
Valve Module in the Improved Auxiliary
Power Unit (IAPU). The NGGVM develop-
ment program is proceeding well.
Recommendation #10
NASA should attempt to introduce the
NGGVM into the fleet as soon as possible as a
safety and logistics improvement.
Finding #11
The decision has been made to install the
entire Multi-Function Electronic Display
System (MEDS) in each Orbiter during a sin-
gle Orbiter Maintenance and Down Period
(OMDP). An Advanced Orbiter Displays/
System Working Group has been formed to
plan for the next generation of MEDS formats
and display enhancements.
Recommendation #1I
NASA should support the Advanced Orbiter
Displays/System Working Group and set a
timetable for the introduction of enhanced dis-
play formats which will improve both safety
and operability. It should also maintain its
commitment to completing the MEDS installa-
tions during a single OMDE
Finding #12
The Tactical Air Control and Navigation
(TACAN) and Microwave Scanning Beam
Landing System (MSBLS) on-board receivers
are obsolescent and increasingly difficult to
maintain. The MSBLS receivers also have
known design problems which can lead to
erroneous guidance information if the Orbiter
is operating with only two of the three receiver
complement. A Global Positioning System
(GPS) test is underway on one of the Orbiters
using the backup flight software and computer.
The use of GPS could replace both the
TACAN and MSBLS systems as well as assist-
ing ascent and on-orbit operations.
Recommendation #12
Given the potential of GPS to improve safety
and reliability, reduce weight and avoid
obsolescence and the many existing and
potential problems with the use of TACAN
and MSBLS, a full GPS implementation on
the Orbiter should be accomplished as soon
as possible.
Finding #13
Growth in the requirements for on-board data
processing will continue as the Space Shuttle
is used in support of Shuttle/Mir, ISS and other
future missions. The length of time over
which the General Purpose Computer and its
software will be able to meet these growing
needs effectively is likely inadequate.
Recommendation #13
NASA should expedite a long-range strategic
hardware and software planning effort to
identify ways to supply future computational
needs of the Space Shuttle throughout its life-
time. Postponing this activity invites a critical
situation in the future.
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Finding #14
The STS-64 mission involved a higher than
usual level of windshield hazing which could
have led to a situation in which the astronauts'
view of the landing runway was obscured.
MSBLS and TACAN are obsolescent. There is
also the possibility that false indications by
MSBLS under certain scenarios could result in
an unacceptable risk of a landing mishap.
Thus, there is a clear need for early upgrade of
Orbiter and support facility autoland equipment
and crew flight rules and training improvement.
Recommendation #14
NASA should improve the autoland equipment
on the Orbiter; for example, replacing MSBLS
and TACAN with GPS. In the interim, NASA
should ensure that operations and failure modes
of MSBLS are fully examined and understood.
NASA should also reexamine the training of
crews for executing automatic landings, includ-
ing autoland system familiarization. Astronaut
commanders and pilots should discuss circum-
stances which might warrant autoland use prior
to each mission and be prepared for all reason-
able contingencies in its operation.
SPACE SHUTTLE
MAIN ENGINE (SSME)
Finding #15
It has become necessary to execute a partial dis-
assembly of both the engines and turbopumps
after each flight because of the accumulation of
special inspection requirements and service life
limits on components of the current (Phase II)
SSMEs. These inspections are performed with
rigor and appropriate attention to detail.
Recommendation #15
In order to control risk, NASA must maintain
the present level of strict discipline and atten-
tion to detail in carrying out inspection and
assembly processes to ensure the reliability and
safety of the SSMEs even after the Block I and
Block II upgrades are introduced.
Finding #16
The re-start of the Advanced Turbopump
Program (ATP) High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
(HPFTP) and the start of the Large Throat
Main Combustion Chamber (LTMCC) devel-
opments were authorized in the spring of 1994.
Combined with the ongoing component devel-
opments of the Block I engine, this will pro-
duce a Block II engine which will contain all of
the major component improvements that have
been recommended over the past decade to
enhance the safety and reliability of the SSME.
Both the Block I and Block II programs have
made excellent progress during the current year
and are meeting their technical objectives.
Recommendation #16
Continue the development of the Block II
modifications for introduction at the earliest
possible time.
Finding #17
In order to provide an engine health monitor-
ing system that can significantly enhance the
safety of the SSME, improvements must be
made in the reliability of the engine sensors
and the computational capacity of the con-
troller. It is also essential to eliminate the dif-
ficulties with the cables and connectors of the
Flight Accelerometer Safety Cut-Off System
(FASCOS) so that vibration data can be
included in the parameters used in the algo-
rithms that determine engine health.
Recommendation #17
Expand and emphasize the program to improve
engine health monitoring. Continue the pro-
gram of sensor improvements. Vigorously
address and solve the cable and connector
problems that exist in FASCOS. Continue the
development of health monitoring algorithms
which reduce false alarms and increase the
detectability of true failures.
Finding #18
The Block II SSME can improve safety if an
abort is required because it can be operated
10
more confidently at a higher thrust level. This
will permit greater flexibility in the selection
among abort modes.
Recommendation #18
NASA should reexamine the relative risks of
the various abort types given the projected
operating characteristics of the Block II
SSMEs. Particular emphasis should be placed
on the possibility of eliminating or significant-
ly reducing exposure to a Return to Launch
Site abort.
EXTERNAL TANK _B
Finding #19
The liquid oxygen tank aft dome gore panel
thickness of the Super Lightweight Tank
(SLWT) has been reduced significantly on the
basis of analyses. To stiffen the dome, a rib
was added. The current plan to verify the
strength of the aft dome involves a proof test
only to limit load. Buckling phenomena can-
not be extrapolated with confidence between
limit and ultimate loads.
Recommendation #19
The SLWT aft dome should either be tested to
ultimate loads or its strength should be
increased to account for the uncertainties in
extrapolation.
SOLID ROCKET
BOOSTER (SRB)
Finding #20
The structural tests of a segment of an SRB aft
skirt in the baseline configuration did not
duplicate the strains and stresses previously
measured in the tests of the full-scale aft skirt
Structural Test Article (STA-3). This suggests
that segment testing of the proposed bracket
modification to improve the aft skirt's factor of
safety may not be valid.
Recommendation #20
NASA should reassess the use of the segment
test method and reconsider the use of a full
scale test article for qualifying the proposed
bracket reinforcement.
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT
Finding #21
The effort by the NASA logistics organization
and its principal contractors has resulted in sat-
isfactory performance. There remain a few
problems, such as a tendency towards increased
cannibalization, which still require attention.
Recommendation #21
Every effort should be made to avoid cannibal-
izations, particularly on critical components
such as the SSME and the IAPU.
Finding #22
The Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP) continues
to meet at six-month intervals, usually at the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) or the Marshall
Space Flight Center. The ILP serves a valu-
able coordinating and liaison function for the
entire logistics operation. Its personnel com-
plement has been reduced as part of the overall
NASA staff cutbacks.
Recommendation #22
NASA should maintain support of an effective
ILP.
Finding #23
There is a plan to consolidate all logistics ele-
ments at KSC except Spacelab over the next
three or four years. This should unify the
entire logistics and supply organization. The
realignments are intended to eliminate duplica-
tion of effort, gain efficiency in support and
materially reduce the cost of operation.
Recommendation #23
Proceed as outlined in the NASA plan.
11
D. AERONAUTICS
Finding #24
NASA has entered into a contract with the
Tupolev Design Bureau of Russia to support
flights of a TU-144 supersonic airplane for a
joint U.S./Russian research program. The TU-
144 has a questionable safety record, and the
particular airplane to be used has not been
flown for a number of years. The level of
assurance available for this flight project may
not be equivalent to that typically associated
with NASA's flight research programs.
Recommendation #24
NASA should assure that all design and safety
data and operational characteristics of this
vehicle have been fully explored.
Finding #25
Wind shear encounters, while infrequent, con-
stitute a highly significant aviation hazard that
has been a causal factor in major crashes. A
joint NASA/Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Airborne Wind Shear Sensor Program
has developed methods, already being imple-
mented, for providing timely warning to air-
craft in danger of encountering such atmos-
pheric conditions.
Recommendation #25
Continue research relating to wind shear and
other aircraft-threatening phenomena, such as
wake vortices, and the transfer of related tech-
nologies to users.
Finding #26
NASA has a coordinated program of tire
research operating from the Langley Research
and Dryden Flight Research Centers. This
program has the capability to provide signifi-
cant safety improvements for present and
future aircraft and spacecraft.
Recommendation #26
In addition to supporting the Space Shuttle and
other research programs such as the High
Speed Civil Transport, NASA should continue
to emphasize and transfer lessons learned in
the tire research effort to all segments of the
user community.
Finding #27
The Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC)
has completed a demonstration of the concept
of a Propulsion Controlled Aircraft (PCA) sys-
tem using an F-15 aircraft flight test and an
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MD-I 1 simulator demonstration. This system
permits an aircraft to be guided to a landing in
an emergency using only thrust for flight path
control. DFRC is now exploring a joint pro-
gram with industry to extend the demonstra-
tion to a flight test on a large commercial air-
craft. Although the PCA concept has been
proved, the pilot control interface aspects of
the design have yet to be systematically
addressed.
Recommendation #27
Any flight test program on a large commercial
aircraft should include a strong focus on
selecting the optimum pilot control interface
for the system.
Finding #28
The range safety policy for Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) operations within the Edwards
Air Force Base range worked when the
Perseus Program suffered an in-flight failure.
Range safety for Perseus flights outside of the
restricted Edwards airspace has yet to be
addressed.
Recommendation #28
Consideration should now be given to estab-
lishing a UAV policy to cover Perseus flights
conducted outside of controlled airspace at
Edwards.
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E. OTHER
Finding #29
The Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue (SAFER)
was successfully flight tested on the STS-64
mission. Although designed as a rescue
device for an astronaut who becomes unteth-
ered, SAFER has demonstrated its potential
to assist in other safety-critical situations
such as contingency EVAs. Five SAFER
flight units have been ordered. Plans are to
deploy them on Mir and Space Station as well
as to carry them on the Space Shuttle only
when an EVA is planned.
Recommendation #29
Once the flight units are available, NASA
should consider routinely flying SAFER units
on all Space Shuttle missions which do not
have severe weight limitations. This will per-
mit them to be used for those contingency
EVAs in which safety can be improved by
giving crew members the capability to trans-
late to the location of a problem to make an
inspection or effect a repair.
Finding #30
NASA has established a Software Process
Action Team (SPAT) to review and develop
plans for addressing the software concerns
that have been raised within NASA and by
several review boards including the National
Research Council and the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel. While NASA has extensive
procedures for addressing software issues in
some arenas, these issues have not received
uniform recognition of their importance
throughout the agency.
Recommendation #30
NASA should ensure that computer software
issues are given high priority throughout the
agency and that those addressing these issues
are given the support needed to produce ade-
quate ways of dealing with them. The creation
of the SPAT was an important initial step
toward dealing with complex safety critical
problems, but much more needs to be done.
Finding #31
There were several in-flight and ground-based
episodes in which astronauts developed
adverse reactions to substances used in human
experiments. Although the researchers guid-
ing these experiments submit their protocols
to a standard Institutional Review Board
(IRB) process, there is no independent over-
sight of the safety of human experiments
within NASA.
Recommendation #31
NASA should provide independent oversight
of human experimentation by establishing a
review process in addition to the standard
IRB and ensuring that the Space Shuttle and
Space Station systems requirements provide
sufficient equipment, staffing and training to
react appropriately to any problems which
might be experienced.
Finding #32
The number of reports submitted to the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
has nearly doubled since 1988 and has consis-
tently been above the levels projected when
the system was started. In these same years,
budgetary resources have remained flat so
that, even with significant productivity
increases, the portion of incidents that receive
detailed analysis has declined. In addition,
ASRS has not been able to develop cost-
effective electronic dissemination of advi-
sories or a program of educational outreach to
expand use of ASRS by the aviation commu-
nity, both of which would be significant safe-
ty enhancements.
Recommendation #32
NASA and the FAA should restore the full
capability of analysis, interpretation, and dis-
semination of the ASRS and promote
electronic dissemination and expanded educa-
tional outreach.
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Finding #33
For many years, NACA and NASA aeronauti-
cal research and flight safety benefitted from
the advice and counsel provided by an advi-
sory group of aircraft operations specialists
consisting of representatives from civil and
military aviation and manufacturers of air-
craft, engines and accessories as well as
NACA/NASA personnel.
Recommendation #33
NASA should restore the previous capacity to
capture the operational experience it found
useful in improving its research focus and
flight safety.
Finding #34
Total Quality Management (TQM) is an
established philosophy within NASA and
among its principal contractors, and imple-
mentations continue to improve.
Recommendation #34
None.
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III. INFORMATION IN SUPPORT OF
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION PROGRAM
Ref: Finding #1
The initial organization of the International
Space Station (ISS) as presented to the Panel at
the Johnson Space Center (JSC) placed the
independent safety assessment function under
the program manager. In actual fact, an inde-
pendent assessment function can only be truly
independent if the director of that function is
established on the same organizational level as
the program manager. In that way, any dispute
automatically elevates to the next higher level
(Associate Administrator) for resolution.
After this was brought to the attention of
NASA management, the organizational struc-
ture was changed so that the head of indepen-
dent assessment reported directly to the
Associate Administrator for Safety and
Mission Assurance (S&MA). This provides
true independence for this critical function.
Ref: Finding #2
The Space Station Freedom (SSF) Program
formed an Assured Crew Return Vehicle
(ACRV) office to examine requirements for a
dedicated spacecraft to return the crew from an
orbiting space station in the event of an emer-
gency. Three Design Reference Missions
(DRMs) were identified including a medical
emergency, an evacuation due to the loss of hab-
itability of the station and a lapse in Space
Shuttle logistics support. These DRMs were
used to develop a set of performance require-
ments for an ACRV to be deployed on the Space
Station Freedom when permanently crewed.
The International Space Station is a different
design from SSF. Nevertheless, the DRMs
remain valid as they were generic to any
crewed orbiting platform serviced by launch
vehicles from the earth. Likewise, the ACRV
system requirements generated from the
DRMs also offer valid guidance for any ACRV
to be built in support of ISS.
At present, NASA has made the decision to
support initial crew return efforts with a mix-
ture of docked Orbiters and Soyuz capsules.
This interim approach does not fully meet the
previously defined requirements for an ACRV.
For example, a single Soyuz cannot accommo-
date the complement of a fully staffed station
and has only about a six month service life on
orbit. Nevertheless, this appears to be a reason-
able compromise as an expedient. The long-
range NASA plan is to deploy a newly
designed ACRV in approximately the year
2002 when the ISS is completed and fully
staffed. This vehicle, which may be U.S. built
or supplied by one of the international partners,
is vitally important for safety. Regardless of
where it is built, its design should adhere to the
systems requirements developed for the SSF
ACRV. These requirements are complete and
appear fully applicable as a starting point for
any new ACRV. Also, in order to be available
by the target date, a commitment to starting this
vehicle must be made in the near future.
Ref: Findings #3 and #4
The ISS design includes systems and proce-
dures to warn of, localize and react to a variety
of malfunctions and emergencies that may
occur during Station operation. The heart of
these provisions is the Caution and Warning
(C&W) system. This system consists of sen-
sors distributed throughout the station which
are designed to detect such things as tempera-
tures, pressures and the presence of particulate
matter within both racks and the general areas
of the modules. Signals from the sensors are
sent to a Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM)
which, acting as a data processor, discrimi-
nates between normal and abnormal condi-
tions. The results of these analyses are sent to
a set of redundant "command and control"
MDMs via a digital data bus. These MDMs
are, in turn, programmed to determine the
nature and level of caution or warning to be
issued. The resulting signals are sent to other
MDMs which drive an annunciator panel in
each of the five modules of the Station as well
as to associated audio systems which sound
alarms as required. The panels contain five
...... ''r" I'OT +'+ '_'=r`
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lights, three of which are programmed to indi-
cate a specific type of emergency: fire, toxic
environment and depressurization, but not the
location of the emergency. In the present
design, localization must be accomplished by
connecting a laptop computer (via a computer
port at the panel) programmed to be able to
query the system as to the location and nature
of the problem.
The layout of the system is reasonably straight-
forward and is independent of the Station's
Data Management System. The fact that the
laptop is apparently not dedicated to the fault
localization process is a source of concern.
Certainly, the time lost in making the computer
connection and running the program would
appear to be a waste of a precious commodity
in an emergency. Also, all software used in any
laptop on ISS must be configuration controlled
and subjected to appropriate levels of
Independent Verification and Validation.
Active attention is being paid to the possibili-
ty of a toxic spill in the station. Every
precaution is to be taken in the design of
containers for and in the handling of toxic
substances; requirements for these safety
aspects have been developed and documented
and are to be levied on all users. Contingency
procedures are being developed in the event
of a spill and are to be part of the training
program for crew members.
The possibility of fire in the Station is always
present, and combustion detectors are among
the sensors in the caution and warning system.
Research into combustion phenomena under
weightless conditions has been conducted for a
number of years, and the processes are reason-
ably well understood. At this time the Station
has selected hand-held pressurized carbon
dioxide extinguishers for fire suppression.
These are to be used after air circulation within
a rack, for example, has been stopped. There
are, however, no experimental data on the
effectiveness of such extinguishers in the envi-
ronment of the Station. Experiments should be
devised for both ground and flight tests to veri-
fy the effectiveness of this fire suppression
technique. These can be relatively simple and
straightforward with the sole objective of veri-
fying the suppression capability of carbon
dioxide in weightless conditions.
Ref: Finding #5
The Space Station's major reason for existence
is to provide a platform for experimentation in
space. As such, there will be great emphasis
on obtaining experiments from diverse
sources. These will likely include the aero-
space industry, which is intimately familiar
with the unforgiving nature and limitations of
space, as well as sources which may or may
not have any concept of the criticality of strict
compliance with the requirements involved.
NASA will make a grave error if inadequate
means are provided to inspect and monitor the
payload/experiment supplier. The Space
Shuttle and some of its major payloads, such
as Spacelab, already have excellent programs
for specifying requirements and verifying
compliance. These existing programs can
serve as models for a similar ISS system.
Ref: Finding #6
Progress has been made this year in several
areas related to the hazard to the ISS from
orbital debris. A new assessment of the debris
environment at ISS orbital altitude has led to a
revised specification of the flux levels to be
used for design. This specification is in the
process of approval by both U.S. and Russian
participants.
Several "campaigns" have been carried out this
year to measure the flux of debris in Low
Earth Orbit (LEO). The Haystack radar and
other radars and optical sensors based at sever-
al latitudes have been employed to amass sta-
tistical data on the flux of particles 1 cm in
diameter and larger in LEO. In addition, good
data were obtained by launching calibration
spheres in the Orbital Debris Radar Calibration
2O
Spheres (ODERACS) experiment deployed
from STS 60 in February 1994 and tracking
them until they decayed from orbit. This
experiment improved the ability to assess par-
ticle size on the order of 30%. Further experi-
ments are planned for the near future to refine
these figures and to introduce dipoles to better
calibrate the radars in all polarizations. The
overall result has been that the measured
debris environment appears to be a factor of
two lower at ISS altitudes (350-500 km) and
somewhat higher near the 1,000 km altitude
than in previously published NASA models.
The approach to evaluating probability of criti-
cal impact has been modified to account sepa-
rately for each of the inhabited modules and to
take notice of the reduced (compared to SSF)
projected area of the current design and
revised flux levels. These changes bring the
"Probability of No Critical Penetration" to
near acceptable levels.
NASA carried out a series of tests in the
Spring of 1994 firing projectiles at hypersonic
velocities (11.0 to l l.5km/sec) into shield
samples. The results of this program have led
to the decision that the "Stuffed Whipple
Shield" will be the standard for ISS. The
Stuffed Whipple Shield is a standard Whipple
shield, a thin metal plate mounted on stand-
offs in front of the protected surface, modified
by inserting a layer of Nextel AF62 and Kevlar
midway between the plate and the surface.
Such a shield proves to be superior, with
respect to mass versus penetration damage, to
an alternate design incorporating additional
aluminum plates. This approach seems
promising for protecting the ISS within mass
constraints.
Protection of the ISS from debris must be con-
sidered as an overall system composed of
understanding of the environment, external and
internal shielding, a comprehensive avoidance
system, and operational procedures to mini-
mize the likelihood of impact as well as to
react to penetration damage and possible
depressurization. Such a design is being pro-
posed, but it is still in the early stages of for-
mulation, particularly with respect to the active
avoidance system and operational procedures.
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B. SHUTTLE/MIR (PHASE ONE) PROGRAM
Ref: Findings #7 and #8
The Androgynous Peripheral Docking System
(APDS) joins the Space Shuttle and Mir using
12 active hooks on the Orbiter side that engage
12 passive hooks on the Mir side. It is not cur-
rently known how man), latched hooks are
required for sale docking security. The best
that can be said is that the number is equal to
or less than 12 but more than zero. The hooks
operate in two sets of six each. One of the
hooks in each set is activated directly by a
motor which also drives a cable control assem-
bly to actuate the other five hooks in the set.
In order to release the orbiter from the Mir, the
motors have to counter-rotate to disengage the
active hooks. Any single failure in the system
can result in one or more hooks not engaging
or disengaging as commanded. The system
design makes no provision to advise the flight
crew or ground control of the status of each
hook, and therefore a positive docking or
undocking indication is absent. NASA should
implement an indicator system as soon as pos-
sible to eliminate this risk.
The first backup separation system for the
APDS is a set of pyro bolts which disengage
the 12 active hooks on the Orbiter side if they
fail to retract. Having to rely on the pyros as
presently supplied by the Russian Space
Agency poses risk because of lack of knowl-
edge relating to the pyros' pedigree and certifi-
cation. A second contingency demate proce-
dure is available involving removal of 96 bolts
at a different interface by Extravehicular
Activity (EVA) if the pyros do not function. In
the event that either the pyro or the EVA plan
to separate Shuttle-Mir must be used, its
implementation may leave the Mir port unus-
able for future dockings.
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C. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
ORBITER
Ref: Finding #9
In order to assemble the Space Station at its
51.6 degree inclination, an additional 13,000-
15,000 pounds of Space Shuttle payload capa-
bility will be required for most assembly
flights. The additional capacity is to be pro-
vided by a combination of weight reductions
and ascent performance enhancements.
NASA has begun to analyze the thermal and
structural loads environments for the Orbiter
after the defined enhancements are incorporat-
ed and expects to complete the analyses in
August 1995. The situation is, of course,
dynamic and highly interactive. The large
number of simultaneous changes creates
potential tracking and communication prob-
lems among system managers. Emphasis must
therefore continue to be placed on the adequate
integration of all of the changes into the total
system.
Ref: Finding #10
The New Gas Generator Valve Module
(NGGVM) development program for the
Improved Auxiliary Power Unit (IAPU) is on
target for commencing fleet retrofit towards
the end of 1996. The NGGVM design effec-
tively eliminates many of the design deficien-
cies and Criticality I failure modes associated
with the Improved Gas Generator Valve
Module (IGGVM) which is now flying. In par-
ticular, the NGGVM: eliminates many welds
and those remaining are inspectable; is
designed to eliminate seat cracking problems;
and has eliminated thin wall hydrazine barri-
ers. The NGGVM design employs a spring-
loaded metal-to-metal seat/poppet configura-
tion for the pulse control valve which will
reduce the safety concerns associated with seat
exposure to hydrazine.
The NGGVM Design Acceptance Review was
successfully completed in late July 1994. Pre-
qualification testing is scheduled to begin in
the second quarter of 1995 and conclude with
a Design Review in the fall of 1995. Long
lead time items of qualification hardware will
be started while pre-qualification is still under-
way (late 1995). Fabrication of qualification
and production units will start in parallel at the
beginning of 1996 to support commencing
fleet retrofit late in that year.
The NGGVM test plan has been greatly trun-
cated based on recommendations of an expert
team. The reduction from the originally
planned 375 hours of testing to only 98 hours
will save cost and time. The rationale for this
reduction appears sound and consistent with a
safe level of operations.
The program has examined three alternative
plans for introducing the NGGVM into the
fleet. The first strives for the earliest possible
incorporation. It would have all APUs upgrad-
ed to the NGGVM by roughly the end of 1997.
The second plan is attrition-based and would
only upgrade the valve in an APU when the
unit was already scheduled for overhaul. This
would delay complete fleet introduction until
approximately the year 2000. The third plan,
which is the present plan for introduction, is
opportunio,-based. The ground rule of this
plan is to maintain a predetermined minimum
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) stock level of
spare IAPUs during the modification cycle to
support any unplanned removals. Any
removed IAPUs not needed to support the
minimum stock level will be shipped to the
manufacturer for the NGGVM upgrade.
Under this plan, NASA indicates that the
NGGVM modifications can be completed in
late 1998 or early 1999.
The problem with the earliest possiMe incor-
poration plan is that it must appropriate flight
assets from the KSC. The projected result,
assuming no unplanned removals, is that there
will be fewer than a shipset of spares on hand
at KSC for virtually all of 1997 and one quar-
ter of 1998. In fact, for two quarters of 1997 a
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position of zero spares is projected. The low
spares count means that any unplanned
removals could force cannibalization to keep
the fleet flying. This is a highly undesirable
situation which mitigates against adopting the
earliest possible introduction plan. Including
the IAPUs on whichever vehicle is undergoing
its Orbiter Maintenance and Down Period
(OMDP) at Palmdale in the spares count pro-
vides only minimal relief for this problem.
The attrition-based plan delays introduction
and hence the availability of an important safe-
ty and logistics improvement. The opportuni-
tr-based plan, while a compromise, may still
be associated with an unacceptably high
chance of the need fbr cannibalizations to sup-
port flight.
There is a possible way to reduce or eliminate
the potential for cannibalizations with the
earliest possible or opportunity-based intro-
duction plans at an additional cost. There are
four baseline APUs in storage which were not
upgraded to IAPUs with the balance of the
units. The program assets include spare IAPU
components sufficient to upgrade three of
these baseline units to IAPUs, although this
would significantly reduce the parts inventory.
If a timely commitment for this conversion is
made, the additional IAPUs would be avail-
able to support NGGVM introduction.
Although this would not move up the comple-
tion date for either plan_ it would ensure that
at least a full shipset of spare IAPUs was
available at all times.
Given the manufacturing problems with the
IAPU which surfaced during 1994 and the
extent of hands-on labor needed to keep them
flying, NASA should carefully consider all of
the facets of the adopted NGGVM introduc-
tion plan and give appropriate emphasis to the
avoidance of possible cannibalizations or the
need for unplanned IAPU removals from
Orbiters during their OMDP.
Ref: Finding #11
A Multi-Function Electronic Display System
(MEDS) with enhanced quality and functional-
ity of displays has great potential to reduce
workload, improve crew response time, reduce
crew training requirements and provide the
crew with better information for both normal
and contingency operations. These capabilities
could be extremely important for the safety of
proximity operations with Mir or the Space
Station. They will also be invaluable in the
event of an abort situation.
The initial plan was to install the foundation
for the MEDS during an OMDP and to com-
plete the installation during normal flows at
KSC. In addition, the displays on tbe initial
MEDS implementation were to emulate the
existing electro-mechanical devices in both
fbrmat and information content. Both of these
decisions delayed achieving the full safety and
operational benefits of which the MEDS is
capable. The Shuttle Training Aircraft and
training simulators are also to be upgraded to a
MEDS configuration.
The Space Shuttle Program has now decided to
install the entire MEDS system during a single
OMDP. Under this plan, an Orbiter will arrive
in Palmdale with conventional instruments and
leave with a full "glass cockpit" installation.
This represents a significant improvement in
the installation strategy and eliminates a myri-
ad of problems associated with a two-step tran-
sition. It has also been decided to depart some-
what from a strict emulation of the old dis-
plays, although a fully developed MEDS for-
mat has been deferred until a later generation
of the system.
NASA has committed to a future phase of
Orbiter displays-and-controls update activities
in order to achieve a state-of-the-art system.
This effort should include both enhancements
to the display formats themselves and the
quantity and nature of information presented.
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Display format improvements for the existing
set of displayed information can be achieved
within the programming of the MEDS itself.
Changes in the type of information presented
will require modifications to the General
Purpose Computer software. An Advanced
Orbiter Displays/System Working Group has
been formed to plan for the next generation of
MEDS formats. This group has a limited
budget and no firm deadlines. Given the
potential benefits from a fully-enhanced
MEDS, it would seem best for NASA to plan
a firm schedule for MEDS upgrades and to
support the working group to the maximum
extent possible.
Ref: Finding #12
The full Microwave Scanning Beam Landing
System (MSBLS) installation on the Orbiter
includes three receivers, although only two
must be operating in order to launch. When
one of the three receivers fails to provide a
correct output, it is taken off-line. This first
failure is easy to identify when all three are
on-line since the failure logically takes place
in the receiver with a signal that differs from
the other two or, if a logic flag within the
receiver identifies a fault in that unit.
With only two receivers on-line, certain fail-
ures may be identified by a flag or by the
Orbiter's on-board computer logic, but the
probability of any failure being detected is
not very high. With the current Orbiter sys-
tem installation the two remaining receiver
outputs are averaged and this signal is used as
a navigation input during the final approach,
flare and landing. If one of the two receivers
fails during this time, the averaged output
will obviously change and the MSBLS output
will be in error. Flying with only two
MSBLS receivers would be adequate for mis-
sion success provided that the flying pilot can
visually monitor the final approach and land-
ing to determine if the remaining MSBLS
receivers are providing accurate guidance
information.
The Global Positioning System (GPS) could
avoid the above deficiencies and thus enhance
the operational performance and safety of the
Orbiter. There are two distinct aspects of con-
sidering GPS as a replacement for MSBLS.
First, MSBLS is not only obsolescent but also
possibly could become a safety issue because
of the great difficulty in maintaining very old
electronic airborne units. Second, there is the
considerable expense involved in maintaining
a network of MSBLS ground stations at all
landing and primary abort sites. The ability of
the Orbiter to navigate independently for
approach and landing using GPS could also
significantly increase the number of contin-
gency abort sites available.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
already announced that GPS may soon be used
as the sole navigation source by the airlines.
Non-precision approaches using only GPS
have already been approved, and precision
approaches will almost certainly follow soon.
The issue of MSBLS seems abundantly clear.
The performance and safety enhancements that
GPS can offer to Orbiter performance in
ascent, aborts, on-orbit operations and
approach and landing warrants its installation
as soon as possible.
Ref: Finding #13
Throughout the history of the Space Shuttle
program, there has been a continuing demand
for upgrades to the functionality achieved with
the on-board General Purpose Computer
(GPC) system. This increase in functionality
has been achieved through upgrades to the
GPC software with the exception of a single
GPC hardware upgrade which took over eight
years to implement. Almost every flight sees
some level of software change, and at some-
what larger intervals, major upgrades to the
software take place. There has been a general
tendency for the memory and processor
requirements to grow during this continual
software upgrade process.
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As early as 1983, NASA recognized the need
to upgrade the computational capabilities in
the GPC hardware, and began a program to
replace the original processors and memory.
In 1991, NASA began use of the "new" GPC.
However, the new GPC achieved considerably
less additional memory usable for active flight
control software than originally expected due,
in part. to the non-modular arrangement of the
Space Shuttle software.
Upgrades to the Space Shuttle software contin-
uc, but at a slower rate than before. There are
concerns within NASA that important safety-
related software upgrades are being postponed
because of the complexity associated with
changing the non-modular software.
Moreover, at some point, the new GPC memo-
ry will be filled, making further upgrades
much more ditficult, or, perhaps, even impossi-
blc. Little analysis has been conducted on the
long term impact of continuing demands for
pcrfornmnce improvements and the ultimate
limits of the current processors.
Attention to date on computer related function-
ality has been largely focussed on the GPCs
and their memory. However, other avionics
components, such as the MDMs, are also grow-
ing older, with an attendant concern over main-
tainability. Concerns have been expressed over
how much longer they can be used.
While the situation with respect to the Space
Shuttle computer and avionics systems has not
become critical, there are at least two major
concerns. First, the GPC is gradually
approaching saturation. Second, the time
required for any major upgrade in
computer/avionics hardware or redevelopment
of the basic flight software is very long, on the
order of a decade. Therefore, NASA should
bcgin a long range strategic hardware and soft-
ware planning effort on ways to supply future
computational needs of the Space Shuttle
throughout its lifetime. Postponing this activi-
ty invites a critical situation in the future.
Ref: Finding #14
The ASAP has long advocated that more atten-
tion be paid to the existing autoland function
on the Orbiter. At present, the capability exists
and crews are aware of it. They do not, how-
ever, train for executing an autoland. They
also do not engage in a formal process to
examine topics related to autoland engagement
and disengagement. These topics would
include such things as conditions under which
an autoland was the preferred mode and how
and when a manual takeover should be accom-
plished if necessary during an automatic land-
ing. The Panel is simply proposing that crews
receive a reasonable level of training and sys-
tem familiarity so that autoland becomes a true
contingency possibility rather than a capability
with a remote chance of being used even if
needed. NASA should also improve the
autoland equipment on the Orbiter; for exam-
ple, replacing MSBLS and TACAN with GPS.
SPACE SHUTTLE
MAIN ENGINE (SSME)
Ref: Findings #15 through #17
PHASE II ENGINE: The current SSME sys-
tems ("Phase II") have performed well in flight
during the past year. However, a number of
new and/or heightened concerns have arisen.
Among them is an increased incidence and
severity of "sheetmetal" cracks (or peeling) in
the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP)
turn-around and inlet ducts. This has resulted
in the need for increased inspections to tighter
limits as well as redesign of the sheetmetal of
the inlet duct including a change in its manu-
facturing technique. It was also discovered
that the turning vanes in the High Pressure
Oxygen Turbopump (HPOTP) preburner
volute diffuser had undersized (out of specifi-
cation) fillet radii, a condition that enhances
the probability of fatigue failure. This has
resulted in a Deviation Approval Request
(DAR) being issued limiting the number of
turbopump starts and runs between removals
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for refurbishing. All told, as a result of the
accumulation of DARs, it is now necessary to
remove and at least partially disassemble the
engine and turbopumps after each flight. The
continuing need for additional special inspec-
tions and service time limits confirms the
validity of the decision to commit to the major
engine improvements that have been under-
taken--the Blocks I & I1 programs discussed
later in this section.
There was a launch abort caused by a violation
of the start limit for the HPOTP turbine
exhaust temperature (1,560 degrees F) on an
engine during the initial launch attempt for the
STS-68 mission. The control system per-
formed as designed during this abort and shut
down all three SSMEs prior to solid rocket
motor ignition. A thorough investigation of
the incident led to the conclusion that there
had been a concatenation of a number of fac-
tors, none of which individually would have
caused the over-temperature, that led to the
shutdown. These factors included, among oth-
ers, a Main Combustion Chamber (MCC) that
had above normal leakage and a flowmeter that
exhibited a calibration shift during its first
acceptance test but performed normally there-
after. The engine containing the pump that
caused the shutdown was removed from the
vehicle and sent to the Stennis Space Center
for test firing. Care was taken to ensure that
there were no changes in its configuration.
The engine performed normally in the test. A
review of the methodology used to set the start
and flight redlines is continuing.
Sensor failures continue to be a problem.
They are mitigated somewhat by the use of
redundant instruments and controller logic.
Some actions have been taken to improve the
reliability of the current sensors. For example,
new pressure sensor inspection techniques are
being employed to help detect and eliminate
particulate contamination. Flux contamination
of the cryogenic temperature transducers is
being eliminated by changes in manufacturing
and inspection techniques and sequences. Hot
gas temperature transducers using thermistors
as the principal sensor will be replaced by a
more rugged thermocouple-based sensor.
BLOCK I ENGINE: The Block I engine
improvement program is proceeding very well.
The Block I engine includes the new two-duct
powerhead, the single tube heat exchanger and
the Advanced Turbopump Program (ATP)
HPOTR The first two of these major changes
have flawlessly completed certification tests.
The first unit of the ATP HPOTP has completed
initial certification testing accumulating 10,000
seconds of run time in 22 test runs and is into
its second series. These tests included consid-
erable time at 109% thrust as well as a margin
demonstration at II!%. The unit was disas-
sembled after these tests and only minor wear
was observed. The turbine blades and the sili-
con-nitride ball bearings were in excellent con-
dition and can be re-used. One roller in the
roller bearing had slight wear indicating con-
tact with the end rail of the bearing--a minor
problem. There was some delamination of the
honeycomb structures that serve as part of the
labyrinth seals between stages of the turbine.
No performance degradation was observed and
the phenomenon poses no danger to the
machine. This wear can be remedied by minor
design changes. The second HPOTP unit had
completed its first series of tests and has accu-
mulated 10,000 seconds of run time without
any problems as of the time of this writing.
As part of the HPOTP program it was neces-
sary, for proper matching of the boost and
main pumps in the oxygen system, to redesign
the angle of the inducer blade of the Low
Pressure Oxygen Turbopump (LPOTP) that
feeds the HPOTR This change is straighttbr-
ward and was achieved without difficulty.
While this was being done, the current (Phase
II) LPOTP began to exhibit excessive ball wear
in its thrust bearing. The solution adopted for
the new LPOTP is to employ silicon-nitride
balls in this bearing. Serendipitously, these
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balls are the same size as those employed in
the HPOTP making the change simple to
implement.
In total, the Block I engine development and
certification is proceeding well and is on
schedule for its planned introduction into the
fleet in the first half of 1995.
BLOCK II ENGINE: This engine version
comprising the Block I changes plus the Large
Throat Main Combustion Chamber (LTMCC)
and the ATP HPFTP is also proceeding well.
Go-ahead for the re-start of the HPF-I'P and the
start of the LTMCC development was given in
the spring of 1994 thereby completing the
scope of the program of major component re-
design and development that had been recom-
mended for over a decade. The LTMCC,
which is considered by many to be the most
significant safety improvement in the SSME, is
ahead of its manufacturing plan, and a develop-
ment unit has been shipped for test. A develop-
ment unit of the HPFTP has also been assem-
bled using parts that had been made before the
activity was put on a stop-work status. At the
time of this writing, a complete Block II devel-
opment engine had been assembled and a full
duration test run (including operation at 109%)
had been completed. The preliminary data
review from this test showed that the perfor-
mance objectives predicted were achieved and
that there were no systems integration problems
evident. The first "final" configuration HPFTP
is scheduled for delivery in the spring of 1995.
The limiting factor in the delivery schedule is
the time to develop and produce an improved
fine-grain casting that should eliminate some
cracking that had occurred in the earlier
version. Other changes such as decreasing the
turbine flow area by increasing the number of
turbine nozzle vanes are to be delivered with
adequate lead time. The increase in the number
of turbine nozzle vanes also detunes the excita-
tion of the first stage turbine blades and should
preclude the cracking experienced at the trail-
ing edge of the blade tip.
HEALTH MONITORING: As noted in last
year's report, it would be advantageous to
develop the engine controller and associated
software and sensors into a true and more
effective "health monitoring system." Such a
system would ideally reduce both the probabil-
ity of shutting down a healthy engine and the
probability of failing to detect an engine mal-
function in a timely manner. Improved health
monitoring would reduce the risk involved in
engine operation. To accomplish this requires
not only development of suitable algorithms
but also improvement of the reliability of sen-
sors and increasing the computational capacity
of the controller. The improvement of sensors
was discussed earlier in this section.
Regarding the controller, during the past year
it was found that it was subject to "single event
upsets" due to cosmic ray strikes either during
flight or on the ground. This eventuality was
believed so remote during controller design
that "radiation hardened" solid state electronic
devices were not selected. It would be advis-
able to substitute such hardened devices for
existing hardware to reduce risk. While this is
being accomplished, it appears possible simul-
taneously to increase computational speed by
adding a co-processor. This would permit the
controller to perform the added functions
required for improved health monitoring with-
out a major redesign and re-manufacture.
Studies have been conducted to define the
algorithms that would be needed to enhance
engine health monitoring. It was found, that
with the current complement of sensors (i.e.,
pressure, temperature, valve position, and
speed) and computational power it was not
possible to effect any significant improvement
in the health monitoring function effectiveness.
It was determined that if engine vibration were
added to the inputs to the system along with
the previously mentioned co-processor, signifi-
cant improvements could be made as parame-
ters of this type can give early warning of
severe malfunction. Accelerometers measur-
ing these variables already exist on each
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engine in the Flight Accelerometer Safety Cut-
Off System (FASCOS). The instruments
themselves appear to have requisite reliability,
but cables and connectors that transmit their
signals do not. Their reliability is so low that
the information transmitted cannot be trusted.
Correcting these problems should be pursued
and, when successful, the development of a
modern health monitoring system (similar to
those employed in jet aircraft) should be
undertaken.
Ref: Finding #18
Space Shuttle operations planning includes
provisions for a variety of aborted flight situa-
tions in the event of the failure of one or more
SSMEs. The particular abort mode to be
flown is dependent on the number and timing
of SSME failures. Loss of a single SSME
leads to one of a series of abort modes known
as intact aborts. The first of these is the Return
to Launch Site (RTLS) abort. It results from
the early shutdown of an engine which yields a
trajectory without sufficient energy to reach
even a Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) site.
RTLS is currently the only intact abort possi-
ble with a single engine failure in approxi-
mately the first 160-175 seconds of flight.
If a main engine is lost in the middle of pow-
ered flight (from approximately 175 seconds to
300 seconds), the Space Shuttle can fly to a
TAL site at Ben Guerir, Morocco; Moron,
Spain; or Banjul, The Gambia. The powered
flight, external tank separation and entry pro-
files of the TAL more closely approximate the
normal flight profile than do the unusual flight
path and maneuvers of RTLS.
When sufficient energy is achieved, the Space
Shuttle has the capability to abort by flying
once around the earth and landing at
Edwards Air Force Base, White Sands Space
Harbor or the Shuttle Landing Facility
(SLF) at KSC. This is known as an Abort-
Once-Around (AOA).
The loss of SSME thrust late in the trajectory
still permits the Space Shuttle to Abort-to-
Orbit (ATO) at a minimum altitude of 105 nau-
tical miles. The mission can then be continued
or terminated "normally" with a deorbit burn
and landing.
Loss of two SSMEs results in a contingency
abort situation. This can require the Space
Shuttle to land at a contingency landing site
or necessitate a bail-out or ditching. The
availability of suitable contingency landing
sites is dependent on the inclination of the
launch (intended flight path) and timing of
the second engine failure. In general, if a
second failure occurs while the Space Shuttle
is already flying an RTLS maneuver,
Bermuda, one of the preferred contingency
landing sites, cannot be reached.
Any abort increases risk over normal flight.
Therefore, although each of the intact abort
types has been "certified" by analysis, avoid-
ing abort situations, especially the more unusu-
al aborts which do not approximate a normal
flight profile, is desirable. Hence, ATO is
clearly the preferred mode since it is really a
quasi-normal operation. The STS 51-F mis-
sion executed an ATO when an engine was
shut down prematurely late in flight due to a
sensor failure. It continued uneventfully and
achieved many of its objectives even though
the intended orbit was not reached.
RTLS raises several particular concerns
because of the unusual flight profile which
must be flown. After the Solid Rocket
Boosters (SRBs) are separated, the Space
Shuttle must continue flying to dissipate pro-
pellants in the External Tank (ET). While dis-
sipating propellants, a powered pitcharound
must be performed so that the Orbiter is literal-
ly flying backwards with the thrust of the
remaining SSMEs being used for braking.
This is followed by a powered pitchdown
before main engine cutoff and ET separation.
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The Space Shuttle then executes a pullout and
enters the region of Terminal Area Energy
Management. The RTLS concludes with heading
alignment and a landing at the SLE The unusual
RTLS maneuver leads to several concerns such as
overheating from flying into the SSME plume
and extremely complex flight mechanics.
Previous examinations have been made of
what is required to eliminate or reduce expo-
sure to RTLS by achieving TAL capability
sooner in the ascent profile. In general, reduc-
ing or eliminating RTLS exposure requires
changes in entry trajectory ("stretched entry")
as well as an SSME abort throttle setting
above the typical 104% level (at least 109%).
For the present engine configuration, the use of
109%, even in an abort situation, was consid-
ered undesirable because of the inherent reduc-
tions in operating margins at the higher thrust.
The upcoming Block II engines, however, are
designed to operate at a 109% power setting
with margins comparable to (or better than) the
current SSMEs at 104%.
[n light of the operating flexibility offered by
the Block II engines, it would appear prudent
to reexamine the entire issue of aborts in
detail. Eliminating RTLS should be one objec-
tive of this review. The resulting risk reduction
and improvement in launch probability would
represent significant benefits to the Space
Shuttle and ISS programs.
EXTERNAL TANK
Ref: Finding #19
The Super Lightweight Tank (SLWT) is being
designed and built for the Space Shuttle to pro-
vide a large proportion of the weight savings
needed to accommodate the increased payload
requirements of the ISS. The liquid oxygen
tank aft dome gore panel thickness of the
SLWT has been reduced significantly from its
initial design on the basis of analytic results.
To stiffen the dome, a rib was added.
The current plan to verify the buckling strength
of the aft dome involves a proof test only to limit
load. This will permit the test hardware to be
reused. The problem is that buckling phenomena
cannot be extrapolated with confidence between
limit and ultimate loads. Thus, the proof test will
only demonstrate that the structure will withstand
limit load without buckling. In order to provide a
sufficient level of confidence, the SLWT aft
dome should either be tested to ultimate loads or
its strength should be increased to account for
the uncertainties in extrapolation.
SOLID ROCKET
BOOSTER (SRB)
Ref: Finding #20
The addition of an external bracket to the aft skirt
of the SRB has been proposed to restore the fac-
tor of safety to 1.4. The effectiveness of this
modification was to be tested using segments cut
from an aft skirt and loaded so that the boundary
conditions of stress and strain duplicated those
encountered in a previous full scale test of an aft
skirt (the "STA-3" test). The first step was to
duplicate the baseline conditions with an unmod-
ified segment. This test did not successfully
repeat the stresses and strains measured in the
STA-3. This suggests that segment testing of the
proposed bracket modification to improve the aft
skirt's factor of safety may not be valid.
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT
Ref: Findings #21 through #23
The principal logistics performance measure-
ments such as cannibalization, shelf fill rates,
zero/below minimum balance and repair turn-
around time showed good to excellent results this
year. Cannibalization has shown the expected
response to the control being exercised, but is
still not at zero and is therefore of concern. The
reporting and control systems have reached a
mature stage and appear to be very satisfactory
for all Space Shuttle elements.
3O
A major effort toward consolidation of logis-
tics activities at KSC has recently been
announced which should optimize spares lev-
els, eliminate functional duplication and cen-
tralize control and administration. A group has
been established to study and recommend final
organizational and functional realignments.
The overall benefits of a comprehensive con-
solidation such as the reduction ot unneces-
sary duplication at KSC are apparent. The
decision to omit the Spacelab logistics
from the new system appears wise as its
requirements and structure are unique and the
program is nearing completion.
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D. AERONAUTICS
Ref: Finding #24
NASA has entered into an agreement with the
Russian Tupolev Design Bureau to support a
set of research flights on a TU-144 supersonic
airplane. The TU-144 has a questionable safety
record, and the particular airplane to be flown
has been "mothballed" for years. The level of
assurance available for this flight project may
not be equivalent to that typically associated
with NASA's flight research programs.
The TU-144 program has the potential for
assisting in validating design codes used in the
High Speed Civil Transport (HSCT) efforts
and can thereby reduce the probability of
making costly mistakes. However, this
depends upon a well conceived program that
correlates the data derived from the flight pro-
gram with predictions. The currently planned
experiments include boundary layer measure-
ments, handling quality assessments, propul-
sion system thermal environment, sonic boom
signatures, cabin noise and temperature pre-
diction verifications.
Before the flight program is to be conducted,
the aircraft will undergo significant modifica-
tions. In addition to being returned to flight
status after a long period of storage, the plans
include replacing the original engines with a
different type adapted from the Blackjack
bomber. This will require adapting new
nacelles and a digital engine controller. In
light of the changes and uncertainties
involved in the TU-144 flights, NASA should
assure that all design and safety data and
operational characteristics of this vehicle
have been fully explored.
Ref: Finding #25
Wind shear is created during an atmospheric
phenomenon known as a "microburst." This
consists of a powerful downdraft that cascades
earthward creating rapidly shifting winds. An
airplane flying into such a condition can sud-
denly encounter winds that can reduce air-
speed to a hazardous level. Wind shear is a
major safety concern even though it occurs
infrequently. It has been a causal factor in at
least 27 U.S. aircraft accidents between 1969
and 1985 and has been cited as the cause of
over 50 percent of accident fatalities in the
1975 to 1985 period. Close calls continue to
be reported; the risk still exists.
A National Integrated Wind Shear Program
Plan was initiated by NASA and the FAA to
develop methods for detecting this atmospher-
ic phenomenon and providing timely informa-
tion to aircraft in imminent danger of encoun-
tering this hazardous condition. The program
consisted of three principal elements: (1) haz-
ard characterization--wind shear physics,
heavy rain aerodynamics, impact on flight
behavior; (2) sensor technology--airborne
doppler radar and other instrumentation; and
(3) flight management systems--requirements,
displays, pilot procedures.
In operational use, the system displays in the
cockpit a predictive wind shear hazard index.
The FAA has already published system
requirements and certified certain technologies
for implementing the system. All national and
international carriers will be required to have
such a wind shear detection system in the near
future--as early as December 1995. The U.S.
Air Force already requires this capability on all
its transport and tanker aircraft.
The wind shear program is a good example of
a productive cooperative research program.
Although the work has already been trans-
ferred into operations, there is more to be done
on the subject of wind shear. For example,
radar frequencies other than the X-band which
is currently employed might profitably be
investigated. Theretbre, continued support of
research relating to wind shear and other air-
craft-threatening phenomena, such as wake
vortices, and the transfer of related technolo-
gies to industry appears warranted.
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Ref: Finding #26
NASA has had a long history of research sup-
porting industry's efforts in tire design and
operation. Through the years, aircraft perfor-
mance has continued to increase placing
greater reliance on tire design for safe high
speed operation, and for durability in service.
Although significant progress has been made,
much work remains. Supersonic aircraft, and
in particular the future HSCT will require
even higher pedbrmance from its tires. The
Space Shuttle has tires that require replace-
ment after each flight. Thus, there are contin-
uing safety and economic reasons for addi-
tional research aimed at developing improved
tire materials and designs.
NASA's tire program operates from the
Langley Research Center using the Aircraft
Landing Dynamics Facility and from the
Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) using
the Convair 990 Landing Systems Research
Aircraft. The combination of a flying
testbed and a ground-based facility provide
researchers with excellent flexibility to study
important tire issues.
Ref: Finding #27
The Dryden Flight Research Center has com-
pleted a demonstration of the concept of a
Propulsion Controlled Aircraft (PCA) system
using an F-15 aircraft flight test and an MD-11
simulator demonstration. The PCA system
permits an aircraft to be guided to a landing in
an emergency using only differential thrust for
control. This might have prevented a crash
such as the one experienced by the DC-10 at
Sioux City, Iowa. With the successful landings
in the F-15 and demonstrations with airline
pilots in the simulator, the PCA program has
clearly progressed beyond the proof of concept
stage and identified the potential safety bene-
fits from a full-scale development and deploy-
ment of this concept. Now that the concept
has been proved and before it is tested in a
commercial transport, it is appropriate to
address the total system design of propulsion
control. This should include a strong focus on
defining and designing the optimum pilot con-
trol interface for the system. A basic concern
is that an assumption appears to have been
made that the standard Mode Control Panel is
the appropriate interface. This may not be cor-
rect. For example, if a pilot must make any
manual throttle inputs,
Panel at the same time
this and other reasons,
using the Mode Control
could be awkward. For
other control approach-
es, particularly the use of the standard controls
(yoke or sidestick) should be carefully consid-
ered. This would result in a control approach
similar to the Control Wheel Steering (CWS)
mode available on many current aircraft.
Ref" Finding #28
The Perseus Program involves Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for environmental
research. Last year, the Panel recommended
development of a range safety policy at DFRC
to be applied to UAVs. Dryden did indeed
develop such a policy in coordination with the
Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) test range.
This policy had to be applied to a Perseus flight
on November 21 when the vehicle diverged at
35,000 feet. The vehicle was lost, but range
safety was not compromised. The vehicle
crashed in the prescribed range safety area.
Dryden is responsible for operating Perseus
flights. An investigation team has been
appointed by the Center Director to review
this incident. Since the intended use of these
vehicles is to provide a research platform for
studies in atmospheric science, the Perseus
will ultimately have to fly outside of the
EAFB protected area. In fact, UAVs such as
Perseus may operate in both national and
international airspace. Dryden cannot take
responsibility alone for these flights. Other
U.S. and international governmental authori-
ties must be involved.
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E. OTHER
Ref: Finding #29
The Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue (SAFER)
is a small maneuvering unit intended to fit at
the bottom of the Portable Life Support
System (PLSS) of an EVA astronaut. Its
design purpose is to permit an astronaut who
bccomes untethered from the Space Station or
a Space Shuttle to return safely. This potential
problem is not considered great for a free fly-
ing Shuttle since it can maneuver immediately
to retrieve an astronaut who is drifting away.
It can be serious, however, if the Space Shuttle
is attached to the Space Station or another
satellite and is not free to maneuver quickly.
In addition to astronaut rescue, there are also
contingency situations which cannot be
resolved at present because an EVA astronaut
is unable to maneuver to the source of the
problem. For example, if there were an indica-
tion that an ET umbilical door on the Orbiter
had failed to close, the crew would have no
way to perform a visual inspection to confirm
the validity of the warning.
Since SAFER was designed primarily for
rescue, it does not include the degree of redun-
dancy typical of human-rated flight systems.
It was reasoned that a single string system
would be adequate for rescue objectives.
However, this lack of redundancy appears to
have deterred NASA from expanding the use
of SAFER to the contingency situations in
which it can be a significant benefit.
Five flight units have been ordered. Three of
these will be deployed on the Mir and Space
Station. The two remaining units are to be
flown on the Space Shuttle only when an EVA
is planned. This deployment strategy does not
make full use of the safety benefits of flying
SAFER. Given that a problem has occurred
such as an indication of an unlatched ET door
or the suspicion of tile damage, it would likely
be an acceptable risk to employ a SAFER unit
to inspect or correct the situation. In general,
if there is the possibility of a corrective or con-
firmatory action to increase flight safety, the
small additional risk arising from the lack of
redundancy in SAFER can be tolerated.
Based on these considerations, it would appear
reasonable to carry one or two SAFER units
on all Space Shuttle missions once the flight
units are available. These units are relatively
light weight and have minimal logistics
requirements. They stow in the airlock on the
PLSS, so they do not require any Orbiter mod-
ifications. The availability of the SAFERs will
provide mission planners with a significant
increase in flexibility to handle contingencies
which might arise. The only exception to the
general deployment of the SAFERs would
arise on those missions which are severely
weight limited and do not have any planned
EVAs. NASA should examine the logistics
and costs associated with a more widespread
use of SAFER, and, if necessary, procure addi-
tional flight units to support an expanded role
tbr SAFER.
Ref: Finding #30
Over the past several years, NASA has
received recommendations from the General
Accounting Office, the ASAP and the National
Research Council among others stating that the
agency needed to give greater attention to
potential software problems. Early in the year,
NASA established a Software Process Action
Team (SPAT) to review and develop plans for
addressing the plethora of software concerns
that have been raised. The problem with the
initial implementation of the SPAT was that
several of the NASA organizations involved in
software development were permitted to
bypass participation.
The SPAT has been addressing a broad range
of important software and process issues,
including:
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• software development processes
• software management processes
• training of developers and managers in
software technology
• software acquisition processes
° the mandating of processes
• the role of a lead center in software
management
• roles, responsibilities and reporting
structure of the Software Working Group
inclusion of people with a software back-
ground in the Systems Engineering Process
Activity
access to launch software of purchased
launch vehicles in view of the Commercial
Launch Act.
It is important that the SPAT focus on the
level of recommendation that can lead to use-
ful work and not get mired in excess detail. It
is better to focus at this stage on what needs
to be done rather than a formula for doing it.
The SPAT was charged with producing a
comprehensive report after a small number of
meetings. In retrospect, there may be too
much in the task statement for the time
allowed. NASA should ensure that computer
software issues are given high priority
throughout the agency and that those address-
ing these issues are given the support needed
to produce adequate ways of dealing with
them. The creation of the SPAT was an
important initial step toward dealing with
complex safety critical problems, but more
needs to be done. In particular, all affected
groups should be required to participate in
these activities.
Ref: Finding # 31
There were several in-flight and ground-based
episodes in which astronauts developed adverse
reactions to substances used in human experi-
ments. Although within the anticipated out-
comes of the experiments, these events raise a
concern with regard to the particular needs of
protecting human subjects in a space flight
environment. An aspect of the problem appears
to be that there is insufficient independent over-
sight within NASA of the safety of human
experiments. The researchers all submit their
protocols to a standard Institutional Review
Board (IRB) process. This is a good step, but it
is a peer review and the IRB members may not
necessarily be knowledgeable about the unique
aspects of human experimentation aboard a
spacecraft. Since NASA has the Office of
Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) and it
has responsibility for incident investigations, it
would seem appropriate for OSMA to become
involved in at least two areas related to human
experimentation. First, OSMA could establish
a review process to augment the standard IRB.
Second, it could ensure that the Shuttle and
Space Station systems requirements provide
sufficient equipment, staffing and training to
deal appropriately with any problems which
might be experienced. Together with the ,stan-
dard IRB, the OSMA review would add signifi-
cant breadth to the oversight of the safely of
human experiments.
Ref: Finding #32
The ASAP has maintained a continuing inter-
est in the Aviation Safety Reporting Sysiem
(ASRS) since ASRS was established in 1975.
In that year, the FAA asked NASA to develop
and operate the system, acting as a neutral
third-party between aviation operating person-
nel and the FAA. The ASRS was designed to
receive voluntary reports of unsafe occurrences
and hazardous situations, process, analyze, and
interpret these reports, and disseminate find-
ings and recommendations to the aviation
community. The program is well managed,
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extremely well-accepted by the aviation commu-
nity, and the system has contributed to aviation
safety by reporting insights and advisories that
otherwise might be suppressed or lost through a
highly-structured regulatory process. The value
of the system has been confirmed repeatedly by
operating and management personnel.
A recent report on the ASRS by a study team
from the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) provided a thorough
and complimentary review of ASRS (A Review
of the Aviation Safety Reporting System, NAPA-
August 1994). Given the many benefits of
ASRS identified by NAPA, NASA and the FAA
should restore the full capability of analysis,
interpretation, and dissemination of the ASRS
and promote electronic dissemination and
expanded educational outreach.
Ref: Finding #33
NASA's predecessor organization, the NACA,
in establishing its research agenda, benefitted
frorn the advice of experts drawn from industry,
the government and academia through an advi-
sory committee structure. One such committee,
the Committee on Aircraft Operations, provided
advice in problem areas relating to meteorology,
fire prevention, noise and flight safety. A simi-
lar panel was eliminated during a period when
NASA was required to reduce the number of its
advisory committees. This has created a void in
the input NASA receives to define its aeronauti-
cal and flight safety research programs which
should be filled. It may be possible to obtain
the needed advice through the restructuring of
the existing committee structure.
Ref: Finding #34
In previous reports, the Panel has questioned
the commitment of the entire NASA/contractor
team to the practice and principles of Total
Quality Management (TQM). Whatever mis-
givings which may have once prevailed are
now assuaged and the Panel is convinced that
NASA and its contractors do, indeed, have
TQM programs worthy of emulation by others
both in and out of government.
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APPENDIX B
NASA RESPONSE TO
MARCH 1994 ANNUAL REPORT
SUMMARY
NASA responded on July i, 1994 to the "Findings and Recommendations" from the March
1994 Annual Report. NASA's response to each report item was categorized by the Panel as
"'open, continuing, or closed." Open items are those on which the Panel differs with the
NASA response in one or more respects. They are typically addressed by a new finding and
recommendation in this report. Continuing items involve concerns that are an inherent part of
NASA operations or have not progressed sufficiently to permit a final determination by the
Panel. These will remain a focus of the Panel's activities during the next year. Items consid-
ered answered adequately are deemed closed.
Based on the Panel's review of the NASA response and the information gathered during the
1994 period, the Panel considers that the following is the status of the recommendations made
in the 1994 Report.
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RECOMMENDATION
NUMBER SUBJECT STATUS
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
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U.S. and Russian Space Program safety concerns
Impact of space debris on long-duration missions
Space Station structural dynamics in collision-avoidance
maneuvering
Space Station Crew Rescue
KSC Continuous Improvement
Impact on safety as a result of cost reductions at KSC
KSC Space Shuttle processing problems due to human factors
KSC Structured Surveillance Program
Thermal damage to OV-103 elevon tiles
Development of improved tiles
Multipurpose Electronic Display System
Improved Auxiliary Power Unit
Autoland
Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME)
High Pressure Fuel Turbopump (HPFTP)
SSME Block II development
Engine Sensors
SSME health monitoring system
Solid Rocket Motor Aft Skirt Stress
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) forward casing crack
Use of Advanced Solid Rocket Motor design features in
the RSRM
Monitoring chamber pressure in RSRMs
Super Light Weight External Tank
Integrated Logistics Panel Support to entire logistics program
Vision 2000 effects on logistics program
Just-In-Time manufacturing and shelf stocking concept
Main logistics system performance
Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) range safety
policy and system
DFRC Flight Safety and Mission Assurance Organization
X-31 aircraft stability
Agencywide policy and process for software
Space Human Factors Engineering Program
Total Quality Management principles and practices
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CLOSED
OPEN
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CLOSED
CONTINUING
CONTINUING
CLOSED
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National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-0001
Mr. Norman R. Parmet
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
5907 Sunrise Drive
Fairway, KS 66205
JUL J 'c,_
Dear Mr. Parmet:
In accordance with your introductory letter to the March
1994 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Annual Report,
enclosed is NASA's detailed response to Section II, "Findings
and Recommendations."
The ASAP's commitment to assist NASA in maintaining the
highest possible safety standards is commendable. Your
recommendations play an important role in risk reduction in
NASA programs and are greatly appreciated.
We thank you and your Panel members for your valuable
contributions. ASAP recommendations are highly regarded and
receive the full attention of NASA senior management. We look
forward to working with you.
Sincerely,
Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
Enclosure
1994 AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL REPORT
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SPACE STATION PROGRAM
Findime #1: Joint U.S. and Russian space programs, including the Space Station, are
now underway. Potential safety concerns arising from these collaborative efforts have
not yet been completely defined or addressed.
Recommendation #1; Safety requirements for the joint programs should be established
from a thorough understanding of the underlying policies of design, test, and review in
use by each country. Timely total systems analyses should be conducted to ensure
adequate safety of components and interfaces as well as overall system safety.
NASA Response: Safety concerns will be addressed by obtaining agreement from both
NASA and the Russian Space Agency (RSA) on a common set of technical safety
requirements and a review process.
The technical safety requirements for the Russian Segment Specification are intended to
be the same as those being imposed on the other international partners. Of the 122
identified safety requirements, 92 have agreement, 15 have pending agreement, and 15
are still under negotiation. Presently, the Russians do not implement a safety review
process similar to NASA's. The NASA safety review process is based on hazards
analyses at the subsystem, system, and integrated levels. The closest equivalent in the
Russian process is a review of "off-nominal" situations. Negotiations are in process to
evaluate the Russian off-nominal situation process for compatibility with hazards analyses
and to ensure that appropriate steps are implemented to address hazards with Russian
hardware. The latest draft of the NASA/Russian memorandum of understanding
provides for a NASA/Russian safety review process in Article 10, Safety and Mission
Assurance.
Findine #2: Much good work has been done to assess the impact of space debris on the
long-duration mission of the Space Station, and significant accomplishments have been
made in developing shielding to protect the Station. However, there is still insufficient
information on the probability that penetrations will have a catastrophic effect.
Recommendation #2: To support effective risk management, NASA should continue its
emphasis on space debris problems, including a better characterization of the risk of
catastrophic failures and art assessment of the capability to add shielding on orbit.
NASA Response: The international Space Station program is continuing to place strong
emphasis on understanding, characterizing, and mitigating the risks associated with
meteoroids and orbital debris. A Meteoroid/Debris Analysis and Integration Team
(M/D AIT) consisting of NASA, contractor, and international partner technical experts
is active and reports directly to the Vehicle Analysis and Integration Team.
The M/D AIT comprehensive strategy for managing M/D risks consists of a three-part
approach; protection, avoidance, and risk abatement. Protection systems (state-of-the-art
shielding) are baselined to prevent penetrations of critical elements for particles that are
sized less than 1 cm. Collision-avoidance procedures will be implemented to protect the
Station from the threat of larger, (typically greater than 10 cm) ground-trackable
particles. The midrange size particles will be handled by a series of risk-abatement
approaches that will be established initially and evaluated continually. These approaches
are being pursued to characterize the risks of impacts of midrange (1 to 10 cm) particles
and to increase the effectiveness of the protection offered by shielding and collision
avoidance.
Risk abatement approaches with the goal of increasing protection system performance
under consideration include: reduction of environmental model uncertainties, enhanced
hypervelocity test and penetration analysis techniques, on-orbit shield augmentation
capabilities, and alternate altitude strategies. Approaches that may increase collision
avoidance effectiveness include enhanced radar capabilities and flight operations
techniques. Finally, approaches being pursued to characterize and minimize the residual
risks include; definition and assessment of critical items and the probability of
catastrophic failures, advanced analysis of critical crack and fracture mechanics, crew
training and operations techniques, and repair and replacement procedures.
iqndinz #3: Consideration is being given to maneuvering the Space Station to avoid
larger debris that are capable of being tracked. Such maneuvers raise concerns about
Station structural dynamics, disruption of the microgravity environment, and the ability of
existing or planned systems to provide adequate debris tracking data.
Recommendation #3; Before adopting any maneuvering option, care must be taken to
ensure that the dynamics of operation, including their effects on hardware, e.g., solar and
radiator panels, and their influence on microgravity experiment operations, are
considered. Realistic evaluation must also be made of the ability of ground-based and
on-orbit systems to support maneuvering options with adequate debris tracking.
NASA Respond;e; A collision-avoidance maneuver is, in practice, the same as a reboost
maneuver. There are no concerns related exclusively to a reboost maneuver due to
structural dynamic effects since all Space Station systems are being designed to handle a
reboost; therefore, a known collision-avoidance maneuver will, likewise, present no
structural problems.
However, a short-notice collision-avoidance maneuver could require a maneuver without
being in the preferred configuration (i.e., solar panels, remote manipulator system). The
operational procedures to ensure structural integrity and afford the capability for
collision-avoidance on short notice continue to be worked.
The microgravity (micro-g) environment would be interrupted during an avoidance
maneuver. However, the Space Station is not always required to be in a microgravity
environment. The current microgravity requirement is for 180 days/year, subdivided into
no less than 30-day periods. Current analysis shows that the Space Station could actually
2
exceedthe requirement by two additional 30-day periods. Therefore, if a maneuver must
occur, and a micro-g period is disrupted, the margin of two micro-g periods can be used
for "recovery."
Ground-based tracking of space debris is provided by the U.S. Space Command, not
NASA. Their systems have the ability to track debris particles as small as approximately
10 cm.
I_ndin_ #4: Present plans for rescue of Space Station personnel axe not fully defined
and may prove unsatisfactory without more precise and detailed planning, including
necessary training and restrictions on the Station population.
Recommendation #4: NASA should reexamine cu:.rent plans to ensure that they meet
the required safety criteria. If they do not, priority should be given to the protocols
necessary to ensure rescue of the entire Station crew if the Station must be evacuated.
NASA Re_onse: The Space Station program is planning for the rescue of the entire
crew in case of medical emergencies, Space Station evacuation, or interruption in Shuttle
operations. Currently, the Space Station program plans to use Russian Soyuz spacecraft
to perform this function during the assembly phase. This spacecraft has been proven
over many years in supporting the Mir station. American astronauts will be fully trained
in the use of Soyuz, and restrictions on its use by our astronauts are fully understood.
Replacement of the Soyuz after the year 2002 is being considered by either a modified
Soyuz or an American-built Crew Transfer Vehicle.
B. SPACE SHIYlWLE PROGRAM
Findin_t #5: The organization and management of Space Shuttle launch operations at
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) continue to benefit from a "continuous improvement
process" managed by the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC). Greater employee
involvement, better communications, strengthened employee training and the use of task
teams, process improvement teams, and a management steering committee have been
major factors in this improvement.
Recommendation #5: A strong commitment to achieving "continuous improvement,"
despite budget cutbacks, should be maintained, at the same time recognizing the
paramount priority of safety.
NASA Response" The SPC continues its deep commitment to Continuous Improvement
(CI) with over 550 active process improvement teams and 86 percent of their 6,600-
person workforce trained in the principles and precepts of CI. The underlying theme of
all SPC initiatives is their pledge for the highest level of performance at the lowest
possible cost with absolute dedication to safety and quality.
Findine #6: More than 1,200 positions have been eliminated by the SPC since
September 1991 with only about 22 percent being achieved through involuntary
separations. Present reductions have been achieved without an apparent adverse effect
on the safety of launch processing. A comparable further reduction has been called for
by the end of FY 1995. These additional reductions cannot likely be made without a
higher probability of impacting safety.
Recommendation #6: KSC and SPC management must be vigilant and vocal in avoiding
any unacceptable impacts on safety as a result of cost reductions planned for FY 1995
and beyond.
NA,_A Re__onse: KSC and SPC management are firmly committed to the precept that
safety will not be compromised as a result of cost reductions. Procedures for processing
a safe space vehicle have been established and are strictly followed. These procedures
are revised only after a thorough review by technical and safety personnel to ensure that
safety will not be compromised. Schedule times are flexible; safety requirements are not.
As the cost reductions continue, KSC is committed to processing only the number of
vehicles that can be completed safely within available resources.
Findinz #7: Several Space Shuttle processing problems at KSC have been attributed to
human factors issues. KSC has recently formed a human factors task force to address
these problems.
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Recommendation #7: KSC should ensure that the human factors task force includes
individuals with training and experience in the field. Specific assistance should be sought
from appropriate research centers and technology groups within NASA.
NASA Response: The Management Steering Committee, chaired by the KSC Launch
Director, established a CI team to support the Incident Error Review Board (IERB) in
assessing human-error factors. This team reviewed the human-factors aspects of the
Freon Coolant Loop Number 1 Pump Package incident on OV°105/STS-61 and made
nine specific recommendations concerning the incident. A tenth recommendation
addressed the need for the team to obtain training in human factors principles.
The CI Human Factors Team has since received training on human factors from the
Battelle Memorial Institute in a seminar conducted at KSC. Some team members
attended a class on incident investigation taught by The Central Florida Chapter of the
National Safety Council. The team has subsequently added a new member with
extensive experience in human factors from Analex Space Systems, Inc. The team will
continue to pursue additional human factors training.
Finding #8: KSC has developed a Structured Surveillance Program with the objectives of
decreasing overall process flow time, increasing "first-time quality.," and reducing cost.
The program approach involves reducing the reliance on inspections for assuring quality.
Structured Surveillance also is proving valuable as a tool for the effective deployment of
quality assurance resources.
Recommendation #8: The Structured Surveillance program should be continued and
cautiously expanded.
NASA Response: KSC has improved structured surveillance data elements, data
collection methods, and metrics for the entire program at KSC (both Government and
contractor) and has discussed these improvements with the Panel. To ensure effective
implementation of the Government application of the structured surveillance program,
the leadership of this effort has been moved up to the directors of the two implementing
organizations. These directors co-chair a newly formed control board that manages the
generation and modification of the policies, procedures, and training necessa_ for full
implementation of structured surveillance.
O_ITEI_
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Finding #9; Thermal damage was noted on the STS-56 (OV-103) elevon tiles. The
slumping of the tiles indicated that the tile surface reached a temperature of
approximately 1,000" F. A temperature of this magnitude suggests that the temper and
strength of the underlying aluminum structure could have been affected.
Recommendation #9: NASA should initiate an analysis to determine the temperature
profile of the underlying aluminum structure of the elevons and its possible consequences
on the strength of the Orbiter structure.
NASA On STS-56 (OV-103), an alternate forward elevon schedule (part of
Center of Gravity Expansion Activities, Detailed Test Objective (DTO) 251) was flown.
This was the maximum-up schedule (12 degrees up) ever flown. There was some tile
slumping (caused by temperatures exceeding 1500 degrees F) at the center hinge
location, but detailed postflight vehicle inspection confirmed that the alurnim_m structure
was neither damaged nor subjected to unacceptable temperatures. Positive Margins-of-
Safety have been verified subsequently through thermal design analysis. A redesign has
been certified and is currently being installed on all four vehicles. This new design will
allow a full-up (16 degrees) elevon without overheating of the underlying structure.
Prior to incorporation of this modification, the elevon schedule had been constrained to
7 degrees up.
lZindine #10: The Shuttle tiles have provided effective heat protection. However, the
surface of the tiles is easily damaged and their shrinkage and distortion properties are
not as low as desired. A new tile formulation with superior characteristics and possibly
lower density is being explored.
Recommendation #!0: NASA is encouraged to support the development of thermal
protection tiles with improved mechanical properties and lower density than the current
Shuttle tiles.
NASA Re_onse: NASA is considering several improvements to the Tile Protective
System (TPS). On STS-51 (OV-105), a tougher tile coating on Fiber Reinforced
Composite Insulation (FRCI-12) tiles was flown as a DTO on a few door tiles on the
base heatshield. There were no hits on these tiles. However, the DTO will be flown a
number of times to obtain a good evaluation of the improvement expected from this
coating. This tougher coating will enhance turnaround activities by minimizing tile
replacement due to coating damage.
NASA has made excellent progress on the engineering of the Multipurpose
Electronic Display System (MEDS) for retrofitting Orbiter displays. However, there is
no formal program to identify and include the safety advantages possible from a fully
exploited MEDS.
R¢cqmmendation #11: A thorough review of the performance and safety improvements
possible from a completely developed MEDS should be conducted based on crew inputs
to system designers and researchers. A definitive plan should be developed to determine
the schedule/cost implications of such improvements, and, if warranted, implementation
should be scheduled as soon as possible.
NASA Re_onse: The MEDS, when operational, will provide a foundation for potential
upgrades and enhancements to the current crew displays that will improve safety. The
initial MEDS program must be on line in a timely manner to replace aging electro-
mechanical devices. The flight crew, mission operations, engineering, training, and
safety, reliability, and quality assurance program personnel have all agreed that the
"transparency" achieved by designing enhanced displays similar in function and
appearance to the current displays is the optimum solution initially. By designing similar
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but enhanced displays, the impacts for a mixed fleet while MEDS is being installed are
minimized in the areas of training and flight software. There is only one single-motion
base simulator, therefore, crews training for MEDS or non-MEDS equipped vehicles will
be able to train on displays that are similar to those they will use in flight. Similar
display formats do not require any changes to the existing flight software. Once trainers
and laboratories are equipped with MEDS, the test beds will be in place to evaluate
display upgrades.
The next phase of the total orbiter displays-and-controls update activities will be to
achieve a world-class state-of-the-art system by expanding the total complement to digital
electronics replacing current wiring and switches as practical. Planning for this phase is
beginning, but the exact implementation schedule will be dependent on funding
availability as well as future human-tended spacecraft planning.
Findine #12: The Improved Auxiliary Power Unit (IAPU) has experienced problems
that have impacted Space Shuttle processing and logistics.
Recommendation//12; A new focus on increasing the reliability of the total IAPU system
should be initiated and supported until the identified problems are solved.
NASA Re_onse: To improve Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) reliability, a continuous
improvement program has been underway since the STS 51-L accident. Results from
this program include the completion of an IAPU "upgrade" project (which eliminated
injector tube corrosion, exhaust housing cracking, and some Criticality 1 concerns), a new
design for the turbine wheel, an improved APU controller and fuel isolation valve, and
the more reliable "Path a" Gas Generator Valve Module (GGVM). These changes have
resulted in a greatly reduced rate of APU in-flight anomalies and fewer delays to the
Shuttle processing and logistics support activities. Elements of the continuous
improvement program not yet complete, but now underway include development of an
entirely new GGVM, certification of a new material for the fuel pump thermal isolator,
and development of more vibration-resistant thermostats. As the new GGVM is
incorporated in the fleet, the APU should be totally certified for its planned 75-hour life
capability.
Findine//15; In its response to the Panel's last Annual Report, NASA indicated that
'q'he program is reviewing the operational flight rules pertaining to Autoland, we have
budgeted upgrades in software and hardware to improve the Autoland functionality, the
life sciences organization is collecting physiological data and developing countermeasures
to ensure adequate crew performance as the mission duration increases. We are
confident with using Autoland in a contingency mode, but do not plan to demonstrate
Autoland until a firm requirement mandates a demonstration."
Recommendation//15; The focus of Autoland should not be exclusively on long-duration
missions. NASA should formulate a complete set of operational procedures needed for
emergency use of Autoland, taking into account a full range of operational scenarios and
equipment modifications that might be beneficial. These include upgrades to the
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Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System (MSBLS) receiver group, and installation
and certification of Global Positioning System (GPS) capability.
NASA Re_onse: It is agreed that the Autoland system should not be focused just on
long-duration missions. Currently, mission planning requirements do not include
missions longer than approximately 18 days, including the Space Station program. The
entry systems requirements including piloting techniques are continuously assessed for
improvements. Autoland backup capabilities as well as heading alignment cone piloting
enhancements axe being developed and will be incorporated as we continue to
implement the flight program. MSBLS/GPS type systems are being considered and will
be brought on line as improvements are practical.
No specific training or procedures are required for the emergency use of Autoland, as
the only manual tasks required of the crew in an Autoland scenario (e.g., deploying
landing gear, postlanding braking, air data probe deployment, and navigation sensor data
incorporation) are identical to those performed in a manual landing. Present flight rules
define orbiter and landing-site equipment that must be functioning to perform an
Autoland landing. The decision to engage Autoland in a contingency is left to the
commander's discretion to protect the safety of the crew. Exact flight rules to define all
Autoland engagement criteria exceed the number of failure cases addressed by the
current flight rules. A program to expand these criteria would require large resource
commitments to develop and is not currently in the planning.
lffndine #14: The SSME has performed well in flight but has been the cause of launch
delays and on-pad launch aborts that were primarily attributable to manufacturing
control problems.
Recommendation //14; Continue to implement the corrective actions developed by the
NASA and Rocketdyne manufacturing process review teams and devise techniques for
detecting and/or precluding recurrence of the types of problems identified.
NASA Re_onse: The process audit teams and the NASA and Rocketdyne incident
investigation teams have both identified process improvements which either have been or
will be incorporated into all areas of the engine program. These process improvements
will improve detection and preclude the recurrence of manufacturing control problems in
any of our new or recycled hardware and substantially reduce the likelihood of
associated problems leading to launch delays or launch pad aborts.
Findine #15: "Sheetmetar' cracks in the Phase II (current) High Pressure Fuel
Turbopump (HPFTP) have become more frequent and are larger than previously
experienced. This has led to the imposition of a 4,250-second operating time limit and a
reduction of allowable crack size by a factor of four. Congress has delayed the funding
for restarting the development of the alternate HPFTP. This new turbopump design
should eliminate the cracking problem.
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Recommendation #15: Restart the development and certification of the alternate HPFTP
immediately.
NASA Response: NASA fully agrees with the recommendation to restart the alternate
HPFTP immediately. Congressional authority to restart the program was received on
April 14, 1994. The Space Shuttle program (SSP) is proceeding with the restart. The
alternate HPFTP will be incorporated into the Block II SSME configuration with first
flight scheduled for September 1997.
l_indine #16: The approved parts of the engine component improvement programs, now
organized into block changes, are progressing well. The Block I grouping will enter
formal certification testing by mid-1994. Progress in the Block II effort is, however,
hampered by the delay in restarting the alternate HPFTP development effort.
Recommendation g16: Continue efforts to complete a//of the Block 17 development as
soon as possible.
NASA Response: NASA fully agrees with this recommendation and is firmly committed
to developing and implementing all of the SSME safety improvements, including the
Alternate HPFTP and the Large Throat Main Combustion Chamber. Upon completion
of these modifications, a significant reduction in Shuttle operational risk will be realized.
Initiation of full-scale development testing is currently planned for mid-1995, with first-
flight capability scheduled for September 1997.
Findine #17: Engine sensor failures have become more frequent and are a source of
increased risk of launch delays, on-pad aborts, or potential unwarranted engine shutdown
in flight.
Recommendation #17: Undertake a program to secure or develop and certify improved,
more reliable engine condition sensors.
NASA Response: Improved hot gas temperature-sensing instrumentation is undergoing
development testing and is planned for the first flight in FY 1995. A two-step
improvement process for pressure and flow measuring instrumentation is also under way.
As a first step, a new screening selection process has been developed for immediate
implementation to improve sensor quality control. The second step, redesigning and
improving sensors, is being implemented as these improvements become available.
_ndin_ #18.. The SSME health monitoring system comprising the engine controller and
its algorithms, software, and sensors is old technology. The controller's limited
computational capacity precludes incorporation of more state-of-the-art algorithms and
decision rules. As a result, the probabilities of either shutting down a healthy engine or
failing to detect an engine anomaly are higher than necessary.
Recommendation #18: The SSME program should undertake a comprehensive effort to
improve the capability and reliability of the SSME health monitoring system. Such a
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program should include not only improved sensorsbut also a more capable controller
and advanced algorithms.
NASA Re__onse: NASA agrees that the development and implementation of an
advanced health monitoring system for the SSME is potentially worth pursuing. A
system currently being considered would incorporate more processing capability in an
upgraded controller and allow the utilization of advanced health monitoring software
algorithms. With an improved system of this nature, the probability of shutting down a
healthy engine would be reduced while the probability of preventing a catastrophic
failure would be increased. NASA is reviewing proposals that would certify and
implement this new capability into the Block II SSME configuration.
_ndine #19: A segment of an aft skirt will be used to test the effectiveness of an
external bracket modification in reducing the overall bending stress of the skirt. The
validity of using an 11-inch-wide test specimen to determine the effectiveness of the
bracket is yet to be demonstrated.
Recommendation #19: NASA should evaluate the first specimen test results to see if the
strains in the weld area duplicate the strains found when a full aft skirt was tested in the
Static Test Article-3 (STA-3) test. If not, another test approach should be pursued.
NASA Response; Tests on three of the four aft skirt test specimens have been
completed. The baseline test article (TA-1), which represents the current aft skirt
configuration, has been subjected to 100 percent of the developed load case. Based on a
thorough evaluation of the TA-1 test data and correlation of the data with STA-3 test
results, it is clear that the weld area strain field developed in the TA-1 test article
correlates well with the strain field in this same area on the STA-3 aft skirt. This
correlation confirms the validity of the test approach being used.
The second test article (TA-4) was also in the baseline configuration and was subjected
to a maximum load of 70 percent of the developed load case. This article utilized the
photoelastic method for determining the strain field as opposed to using the typical strain
gage method used on all other articles in this test program. This test verified that the
STA-3 strain field could be duplicated on two separate articles within acceptable limits
and that no high strain areas were overlooked during the analytical study of the test
article response.
The third test article (TA-2), which has an external bracket for the reduction of strain in
critical weld region, was subjected to 205 percent of the developed load case with no
structural anomalies occurring. Comparisons of the baseline configuration article (TA-1)
and the bracketed configuration article (TA-2) were made at 100 percent loads. This
comparison demonstrated that there was approximately a 50 percent reduction in the
average weld strain in the critical weld region.
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The baseline configuration article (TA-1) was tested to failure during June 1994. This
test defined the weld failure strain for the TA-1 article. Test data obtained from this
test is being compared to the results of the 205 percent TA-2 test and the STA-3 test to
develop a comparative assessment of the benefit gained by the addition of the external
bracket modification. If this assessment does not reveal adequate stress reduction,
additional testing may be indicated.
Findine #20: A small crack was found in the inner wall of a forward Redesigned Solid
Rocket Motor (RSRM) casing used for STS-54. Although slightly above the specified
minimum detectable size, it was well within the acceptable limits for safe flight. This
was the first time that a crack had been found in a forward segment, although cracks
have previously been detected in other segments. The crack occurred during the
manufacturing heat treatment process because of an inclusion in the parent material.
Recommendation #20; The X-ray and magnetic particle inspection program criteria
should be re-evaluated to assess their ability to detect cracks of the size found.
NASA Response; A single crack was detected during standard refurbishment of the
forward segment flown on STS-54. The subsequent investigation determined that an
inclusion introduced into the metal during the manufacturing process caused the crack to
form during heat treatment of the cylinder. The segment had been flown four times
prior to detection of the crack. Prior to each of these flights, the cylinder was proof
tested, which demonstrated safe life (4 mission cycles) in the membrane region where
this crack was found.
All areas of the RSRM metal hardware (case, nozzle, igniter) have been reevaluated
with respect to critical flaw size and whether proof test, magnetic particle inspection or
other nondestructive evaluation methods are required to demonstrate comp!iance .to safe
life requirements. As a part of this reevaluation, an RSRM hardware configuration
specific magnetic particle inspection probability of detection (POD) study was completed.
Prior to this study, crack detection threshold limits were based on industw standards.
This RSRM magnetic particle inspection POD study incorporated RSRM specific
geometries, physical access, gauss levels, surface finishes, potential flaw types, inspection
times, and multiple operators. The results demonstrated that, in the areas of the RSRM
hardware upon which magnetic particle inspection is solely relies, the detectable flaw size
is smaller than the critical flaw size. Proof test is the method of choice used to
demonstrate safe life in the case membrane region, not magnetic particle inspection.
X-ray inspection is not used for crack detection in RSRM metal hardware. Magnetic
particle inspection capability has been reevaluated and, as a result of an RSRM
hardware configuration specific POD study, detection capability versus location is well
characterized. In those areas that rely solely on magnetic particle inspection, the
detectable flaw size is smaller than the critical flaw size.
Finding #21: The Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) project has been canceled.
Some elements from the ASRM development have possible reliability and/or
performance benefits if they were applied to the RSRM.
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Recommendation #21: Examine the potential applicability and cost-effectiveness of
including selected ASRM design features in the RSRM.
NASA Re_onse: The RSRM project has continued to consider ASRM design attributes,
as motivated by RSRM flight results, performance goals, obsolescence issues, and cost
enhancements. Examples of these are the RSRM project's ongoing initiative to replace
metal parts vapor degrease cleaning with an aqueous process and the ongoing initiative
to remove asbestos from the primary RSRM insulation material. Both of these
obsolescence replacement activities have drawn from previous ASRM activity.
There are numerous ASRM design attributes for potential consideration for future
adoption in the RSRM. These include, in part, propellant formulation (hydroxyl-
terminated polybutadiene), sealing system designs, pressure vessel design and materials,
some attributes of the nozzle design, and some manufacturing process automation, such
as insulation strip winding and Real Time Radiography (RTR) for nozzle and case
inspections. At present, the RSRM project is considering incorporation of the previous
ASRM RTR system into the RSRM hardware verification process and the use of ASRM
manufacturing equipment for nozzle fabrication. Based on collective consideration of
the implementation cost impacts and RSRM flight demonstrated hardware performance,
no requirements have been established to pursue the ASRM sealing system, pressure
vessel, or nozzle design attributes. However, future justifications in these areas are
possible based on continuing RSRM flight evaluation or increased Shuttle program
performance requirements.
I_ndine #22: A chamber pressure excursion of 13 psi (equivalent to a thrust
perturbation of 54,000 pounds) occurred in one of the RSRMs of STS-54 at 67 seconds
of motor operation. A thorough investigation of the phenomenon was initiated and
found that the most probable cause was the expulsion of a "slug" of liquid slag
(aluminum oxide) generated during normal propellant combustion. Analyses showed
that, even under statistical worst-case conditions, the safety of the Shuttle system is not
compromised by such perturbations. Some testing and analyses are still scheduled to
complete the investigation.
Recommendation #22: Complete and document the investigation, and continue the
established practice of monitoring chamber pressures and examining possible remedial
actions.
NASA Response: The RSRM project has concluded its investigation and has determined
that the generic cause of chamber pressure excursions is the periodic expulsion of liquid
slag (aluminum oxide). Slag is produced during normal propellant combustion and is
temporarily accumulated in the aft end of the nozzle prior to being "dumped" through
the nozzle. The RSRM project has implemented the recommendations set forth by the
Panel and has established a program to continue to evaluate multiple parameters that
could affect the pressure perturbations. The results and findings of these studies are
being reviewed and changes to the processes or specification will be made if it is
concluded that they will be beneficial to the program.
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A very detailed study of many process and material parameters that influence slag
formation has been conducted to determine if a statistical correlation exists between
these parameters and the pressure perturbations. Examples of these parameters include
humidity, time in process, ammonium perchlorate (AP) moisture content, mix times, cast
times, viscosity, mechanical properties, and many others. No special causes or process
deviations related to pressure perturbations have been identified. Analyses have shown
that, under the worst case conditions, the safety of the Shuttle system is not compromised
by the pressure phenomenon. The results of this extensive study are currently being
documented by Thiokol.
Chamber pressures are being analyzed or monitored by Statistical Process Control charts.
Eighteen acceptance tests are conducted for each lot of AP. The flight and static test
pressure perturbation history is reviewed before every launch. Additionally, several
other studies are being conducted to improve the predictability of pressure excursions.
Quench bomb tests recorded with high-speed trflm have been used to identify burn-rate
differences in the various propellant mixes. Five-inch diameter spin motor tests are
being conducted to evaluate the amount of slag that is generated in a motor. This
testing employs a design of experiments to evaluate the effects of ground AP, unground
AP, differences in AP vendors, aluminum-particle sizes and vendor differences, particle-
size distributions, iron oxide surface area, and several other parameters.
EXTERN_T_
Findine #23: A Super Light Weight External Tank (SLWT) has been proposed as a
means of increasing the payload performance of the Space Shuttle. The tank would
employ structural changes and be made from an Aluminum-Lithium (Al-Li) alloy. The
SLWT appears to involve no safety decrement and low technical risk.
Recommendation #23; The impact of the SLWT on the total system should be care- fully
examined.
NASA Re_onse: The External Tank Project and Shuttle program are thoroughly
committed to an integrated system approach to the design and development of the
SLWT. A systems integration plan to ensure the timely assessment of SLWT effects on
the Shuttle system, and to ensure programwide-managed implementation is currently in
development.
Finding #24: The Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP), which meets at 6-month intervals to
report and coordinate the activities of the NASA Centers and their contractors, is
performing a vital service in helping to control the entire Space Shuttle logistics program.
Recommendation #24: The ILP should continue to be supported as an effective means of
maintaining control and coordination of the entire logistics program.
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NASA Response: NASA Centers and contractors continue to support the ILP and
related integration activities. ALl project elements benefit from the exchange of technical
data presented at ILP meetings. NSTS 07700, Volume XII, "Integrated Logistics
Requirements", the program's requirements for integrated logistics was recently updated,
and the ILP provided a focus for this effort. The ILP will continue to serve as the forum
for problem solving, technical information exchange, and the appropriate level of control,
coordination, and integration of Shuttle logistics support.
The Vision 2000 cost-reduction program promulgated in May 1993 includes
some major changes in the logistics and support areas.
R¢¢ommer_dation #25: All changes that might impair logistics and support functions in
the name of cost-cutting should be most carefully reviewed before implementation.
NASA Response: As the program continues to plan for the future, the Vision 2000
approach to the program will remain relevant. The Vision 2000 approach is based on the
following two principles: operate within SSP experience and locate decisionmaking near
operations. Notwithstanding the advantages these principles offer to the current Shuttle
logistics community, the SSP office will remain vigilant and exercise caution when
making cost-cutting decisions and changes necessitated by funding reductions.
Findin_ #26: Introduction of the Just-In-Time (JIT) manufacturing and shelf-stocking
concept by NASA logistics at KSC is a potentially effective method of cost control.
Recommendation #26: JIT should be used with caution and with a thorough
understanding of how it may impact the availability of Space Shuttle spares and
hardware supplies.
NASA Re_onse: All projects have cautiously considered the JIT method of spares
provisioning and axe in different stages of planning and implementation. Launch and
Landing Project (L&L) has applied the JIT method to manufacturing activity. In
addition, L&L is further studying alternative methods of prioritizing repair work which
may be applied to JIT repairs at a later date. Operational availability will be uppermost
in any JIT implementation decision strategy affecting spares and hardware supplies.
Hndine #27: A review of the main logistics system performance parameters indicates
that the program is generally performing effectively. There are minor problems with
zero balances, and repair turnaround times appear to be worsening. Cannibalization,
with the exception of the IAPU, is at a minimum. Because of manufacturing and
assembly quality problems, the number of spare engines is at a minimum and could
become a logistics problem.
Recommendation #27: Additional emphasis should be focused on repair turnaround time
improvement and the reduction of cannibalization of SSME and IAPU components.
NASA should continue the efforts to improve SSME manufacturing control and quality
processes to preclude future engine availability problems.
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NASA Resvons¢; Supportability indicators for improved performance are continually
monitored. Increased coordination with vendors, transition of selected tasks from
vendors, and resolution of technical issues related to higher-than-normal hardware failure
rates have assisted in expediting hardware delivery. The average repair turnaround time
for L&L is 25 percent lower than FY 1988, but supportability is the key measurement of
logistics success. Items that are not needed to ensure support (on either a vehicle or the
shelf) are no longer being repaired on a priority basis to save dollars. Minor problems
associated with zero balances should improve through the identification of single-source
vendors and continued efforts to identify alternate sources.
IAPU's continue to be worked on a priority basis. Most of the technical problems
associated with cannibalization in 1993 have been solved. There was no cannibalization
during the period January through April 1994, as there are spare units at KSC. In
addition, ongoing discussions with vendors are attempting to improve production issues,
and a redesign is underway as a long-term solution. Monitoring of this critical asset will
continue.
The SSME Project Office encountered a short-term issue with contamination of
temperature transducer probes. Plans for resolution of this issue include process changes
and testing (green run) prior to delivery to L&L. Pump and nozzle shortages are the
result of natural disaster (Northridge earthquake), other technical issues, and the SSME
project standdown period. Full implementation of changes in methods of support to
manufacturing control and quality processes should improve availability of SSME
hardware. We will intensively manage the correction of these issues to ensure
availability of complex SSME hardware.
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C. AERONAUTICS
Findine #2& The Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRF) does not presently have a
range safety policy and system for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) such as the
Perseus, which is about to enter extensive testing. A working group under the DFRF
Chief Engineer is examining the issue.
Recommendation #28: DFRF should develop a range safety policy and system that are
adequate to cover its contemplated UAV projects.
NASA Re_onse: The Director of the Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC), nee
Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRF), has recently established a policy document on
UAV flight operations and activities. This policy has been coordinated closely with
Edwards Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) officials, since air space and facilities
are managed by the local Air Force establishment.
The Perseus UAV, having just completed its initial contracted flight test activity, during
which it achieved an altitude of 16,500 feet, is being operated in accordance with this
policy. It is our intent to continue using the Perseus vehicle as a pathfinder for
validation of UAV operational procedures during step-by-step expansion of the flight
envelopes for expanding the flight altitude up to 85,000 feet. DFRC will continue to
assure safe flight operations and control of UAV flight activities through technical risk
analysis, management reviews, and the imposition of appropriate range safety precautions
prior to each flight.
/_lad.0Ig..._/_ The DFRF flight safety and mission assurance organization now reports
directly to the Director of the facility.
Recommendation t_29: None.
NASA Re_onse: This change in reporting authority will continue to ensure that flight
safety and mission assurance issues are addressed in a timely manner and to the
appropriate level of Center management.
Findine #30: The X-31 aircraft exhibited some undesirable stability characteristics at
higher subsonic speeds and an unexpected departure during a high angle of attack test.
It also carries an insufficient quantity of hydrazine to run its emergency power unit long
enough to return to the Edwards runway from the typically used flight test site.
Recommendation #30: Future test objectives for the X-31 should be based on an
assessment of the specific program objectives that can only be uniquely and safely
performed by this aircraft.
NASA ResPonse: The X-31 has no undesirable stability characteristics at higher subsonic
speeds within its current cleared flight envelope. There is, however, a pitch-up tendency
between 0.91 and 0.95 Mach number when the aircraft is between 10 degrees and
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12degreesangle of attack (AoA). This represents flight at elevated gravitational (g)
loading (2.5g to 4.5g, depending on altitude) outside of the 0.9 Mach number envelope
limit. The condition is caused by a positive (nose up) break in the airframe pitching
moment. It was predicted by wind tunnel tests and was a known condition prior to being
encountered in flight when the aircraft inadvertently exceeded the Mach limit during a
wind-up turn.
To mitigate the risks associated with this characteristic, the X-31 now operates with the
flight envelope restricted to 0.85 Mach number, except for planned test maneuvers. As
an added precaution, the Master Caution/Warning (MCW) tone activates when the
Mach number exceeds 0.88 and a caution light is illuminated in the cockpit. When
specific tests, such as the supersonic quasi-tailless demonstration, require exceeding this
Mach number, the air crew and engineering staff are briefed, an AoA limitation is
enforced, and responsibilities for real-time monitoring are reviewed. The reduced Mach
limit and other procedures have not affected achievement of the X-3 l's flight test goals.
No subsequent pitch-up incidents have occurred since these procedures were emplaced.
The X-31 experienced a yawing departure very early in its poststall envelope expansion
flight test program. The test, a split-s and pull to 60 degree AoA from 125 knots
calibrated airspeed (KCAS) at 35,000 feet (about 1.3g's maximum), was only the third
elevated g post-stall entry test and represented a modest step toward the goal of 0.7
Mach number post-stall entries. Both the pilot and the control room quickly recognized
the departure and called for recovery according to the prebriefed monitoring procedures.
The pilot was able to immediately pitch down to conventional AoA and recover the
aircraft to controlled flight.
The departure was due to an unexpected aerodynamic asymmetry., but such occurrences
were not unanticipated. The pitch recovery margin designed into the aircraft, the
planned and gradual buildup of flight maneuvers and conditions, and the monitoring
procedures ensure the maximum chance for safe recovery from this kind of unexpected
problem.
Further, after the "departure," poststall flight-envelope expansion was suspended until the
cause of the departure was identified, understood, and fixed. Wind tunnel tests indicated
that the large aerodynamic yaw asymmetries that caused the departure were due to the
very sharp nose of the X-31 aircraft. The asymmetries experienced during flight were
more than five times as large as wind tunnel predictions, but it was discovered that the
aircraft was built with a nose that was sharper than the wind tunnel models. The wind
tunnel tests further suggested that a slight blunting of the aircraft nose to match the wind
tunnel model would probably eliminate the problem and that small nose strakes would
further improve the asymmetries and the directional stability of the aircraft at 60 degree
AoA.
The aircraft was modified to blunt the nose and add the nose strakes. Maneuver and
flight condition buildup was changed to increase in smaller steps. Monitoring procedures
were reviewed (and subsequently adjusted), and the flight test expansion of the
elevated-g, poststall entry and maneuver envelope resumed. Since then, no departures or
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near-departures have occurred, and the aircraft has been cleared to poststall entries up
to 265 KCAS or 0.7 Mach number (almost 6g's maximum) with unrestricted maneuvering
up to 70 degrees AoA. These flight test operating modifications will enable the project
to accomplish its tactical utility program objectives.
During the design, fabrication, and assembly of the X-31, Rockwell, MBB, and the Naval
Air Systems Command were confronted with a number of difficult tradeoffs in
attempting to achieve the desired thrust-to-weight ratio in the aircraft. One of the most
deliberated issues was the purpose and function of the electrical power unit (EPU). As
a result of these deliberations, the EPU was sized for the purpose of providing
uninterrupted electrical and hydraulic power for enough time to restart the engine in the
event of a engine flameout. The EPU was never intended nor, more importantly,
designed to provide the capability to return to base.
The philosophy for the utilization of the EPU is consistent with other single engine
aircraft (i.e., the X-29A and the F-16). The X-31 EPU run time is nominally
4.5 minutes, while the X-29A had 8.0 minutes and the F-16 has a minimum of
10.0 minutes. DFRC's current operating procedures do not recommend a dead-stick
landing (neither did the X-29A's); however, it is a pilot option if the aircraft is close to a
landing flight condition.
The ability to land "engine-out" is determined by both the EPU time and the flame-out
landing distance of the aircraft. The flame-out landing distance is an imaginary inverted
cone of distance versus altitude determined by the glide ratio of the aircraft. This cone
may be further restricted in altitude and distance by EPU duration. Outside of this
cone, no mount of EPU time will permit an "engine-out" landing. Much of the flight
test site areas typically used at Edwards are beyond the flame-out landing range of any
fighter aircraft. Flights at 10,000 feet, for example, would have to be performed within
approximately 10 miles of Edwards to remain within this glide cone.
When the aircraft were moved to Dryden and NASA became an active member of the
International Test Organization and assumed flight clearance authority, a complete
independent review of the aircraft systems and issued flight clearance using the Dryden
Basic Operations Manual was conducted. During the course of this review, DFRC
focused on two major concerns-the potential for the engine to stall during high AoA
testing and the quantity of hydrazine available for the EPU.
The potential for the engine to stall during high AoA was studied at the outset of flight
test operations, as an undesired event, and was subsequently assigned the probability for
occurrence as being unlikely (but possible), and the risk for potential loss of aircraft
(with safe ejection of the pilot) was accepted. As the result of a more recent review of
the accepted risks, the probability of occurrence was downgraded to extremely improbable
based on the completion of high AoA envelope expansion and more than 170 hours of
aggressive maneuvering performed during the tactical utility phase of the program with
no engine anomalies or stalls experienced. Engine operation will continue to be
monitored "real time" from start through shutdown, and any additional knowledge
18
obtained will modify our risk knowledgedata baseor, more importantly, it may form the
basisfor changesto mitigate risk.
To assessthe potential impact due to the low quantity of hydrazine available for the
EPU, Dryden performed a complete-riskanalysisof the aircraft, including engine and
subsystemreliability, proximity of flight operations to landing areas,and other pertinent
factors. Based on this review, a hydrazine quantity gagewas installed to give the pilot
essentialinformation on whether or not to remain with the aircraft in the event of a
systemfailure. The gagequantity is checked aspart of the aircraft preflight inspection
and the hydrazine quantity is monitored "real time".
Based on our experience with the X-29A, we concluded that the philosophy embodied in
the original design was reasonable, and the risk was acceptable if we instituted and
maintained a closely managed quality control and maintenance inspection program.
Therefore, Dryden management placed hydrazine quantity on the accepted risk list. We
are managing risks that are entirely acceptable for this experimental aircraft program,
sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). This has been borne
out by the successful completion of all program objectives to date.
Safety of the operation of the aircraft test vehicle and safety of the test points to be
performed are continually reviewed and improved. The "unexpected departure during a
high angle of attack test" is an excellent example of how an unexpected problem was
dealt with and eliminated.
As a result of the extremely successful completion of the X-31 flight test program
objectives, an 8-month follow-on program is being planned to explore in-flight virtual
targeting development, assessment of high AoA/off boresight missiles, pseudo tailless
aircraft flight tests, using thrust vectoring; and evaluation of high AoA handling qualities
and design criteria, as evolutionary steps to the completed program. These programs will
use the existing flight envelope and the same airspace used in the completed program.
The only planned use of the supersonic corridor, which results in the greatest excursion
from the Edwards Air Force Base airspace, is during a portion of the Agile Warrior
virtual-adversary demonstration.
This high-priority Navy/ARPA-sponsored follow-on program takes advantage of the
unique capabilities of the X-31 aircraft to begin pursuing these objectives immediately.
These capabilities include providing support for existing research and laying the
groundwork for follow-on efforts, such as the Joint Advanced Strike-Fighter Technology
Program.
At the completion of the 8-month follow-on program, an assessment and review will
evaluate the feasibility and risks associated with the reduction of vertical tail size as a
further extension of the study of thrust vectored flight capability. Results from this
assessment will be briefed to the Dryden Airworthiness Board as part of the new
program proposal and appropriate action will be taken. The ASAP Chair will be invited
to the Air Force Safety Review Board review of this subject.
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The reduced tail size tests will use the X-31's mature simulation data base, its fully
integrated thrust vectoring/flight control system, and the experience gained in the quasi-
tailless tests to investigate tailless flight. This will provide valuable experience and data
to support design drag, weight, and manufacturing savings to commercial and to military
aircraft. Military aircraft would also benefit from the reduced-radar signature of these
new designs.
The "Agile Warrior" program will integrate key enabling technologies, such as advanced
pilot situational aids, helmet displays, cockpit displays, and a wide-area distributed
simulation network, to create a realistic war fighting/training environment linking
airborne aircraft with multiple ground-based simulators. This promises cost savings in
both training and in rapid assessment of advanced technologies in a large-scale, realistic
simulation environment.
Other tests investigate sensor design, maneuverability, agility, performance, and handling
qualities during poststall maneuvering and in conventional flight using thrust vectoring.
The valuable data from these envelope-expanding flight tests will enhance integration of
these technologies into operational aircraft designs.
In conclusion, safety of flight for the X-31 International Test Organization has always
been and will continue to remain our foremost guiding principal. The achievement of
planned flight test objectives will continue to be guided by a methodical process of flight
data evaluation and gradual, deliberate expansion of flight envelopes. Risks will be
understood and prudently accepted with the safety of the pilot and aircraft as the
principal considerations.
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D. OTHER
b_'nding #31¢ NASA's past approach to software development has been to incorporate it
within the individual programs, allowing them to determine their own requirements and
development, verification, and validation procedures. In the future, as the complexity of
NASA's computer systems and the need for interoperability grow, this mode of operation
will be increasingly less satisfactory. While NASA has some good software practices, it
does not have the overall management policies, procedures, or organizational structure
to deal with these complex software issues.
Recommendation #31: NASA should proceed to develop and implement an Agencywide
policy and process for software development, verification, validation, and safety as
quickly as possible.
NASA Re_onse: A software process action team, sanctioned by the Acting Deputy
Administrator and the Information Resource Management Council, is working on
Agency software issues including roles, responsibilities, standards, and procedures. The
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance is leading the Agency in strategic planning for
the Agencywide software program with a NASA working group consisting of members
from Centers, industry, and academia.
A Software Safety Standard has been completed. Our present plan is to establish this as
an interim standard for 1 year at which time it will become a mandatory requirement for
newly developed software. The Software Independent Verification and Validation
Facility will focus on the Agency software processes for development, verification, and
validation in accordance with the Software Strategic plan currently being developed.
_nding #32: NASA has consolidated life and microgravity sciences and applications,
including human factors in the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications
(Code U). A Space Human Factors & Engineering Program Plan is being prepared to
guide future research activities. There remains, however, a clear need for more
operational human factors input in both the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs.
Recommendation #32: The Program Plan should be expanded to include support of the
operating space flight programs to ensure that sufficient human factors expertise is
included.
NASA ResPons¢¢ The Life and Biomedical Sciences and Applications Division is
committed to developing a new, dynamic Space Human Factors Engineering Program
that will integrate human factors knowledge and methodologies into the Shuttle and
Space Station programs. Leadership of this program resides within the Environmental
Systems and Technology Branch of Code U, which is responsible for directing an
integrated Space Human Factors Engineering research and development program. New
processes and procedures will be developed to enhance crew training, augment the
design of complex automated systems, and use extreme and isolated environments to
conduct analog studies. Research programs will continue; however, the primary focus of
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the program will shift from knowledge acquisition to knowledge application. This shift will
extend human factors support to operational areas and emphasize the improvement of
processes and products.
The Space Human Factors Engineering Program Plan, developed in 1993, is being
revised to reflect this shift of emphasis, and an implementation plan will be developed to
establish and maintain this new focus. Emphasis will be placed on identifying specific,
adequate funding for meaningful results, and promoting the added value of human
factors through concurrent engineering throughout the Agency. A Space Human Factors
Engineering Chastomer Team, currently being established at Headquarters with
representatives from Codes U, M, R, and Q, is being received in a spirit of cooperation
and collaboration. These changes should create a safer and more productive operational
environment for all flight and ground activities planned for current and future programs.
/_//td./_n.g.._.,_ There are excellent examples of Total Quality Management (TQM)
principles and practices in various contractor and NASA activities.
Recommendation #33: NASA and contractor management should use the existing
effective TQM implementations as models for their continuing TQM efforts.
NASA Respons.e; The Office of Continual Improvement is aggressively pursuing
implementation of TQM across NASA. Particular emphasis has been focused on the
Agency Quality Steering Team (QST) and Continual Improvement Council (CIC)
activities. The Agency Continual Improvement Plan is in the final stages of development
and is expected to be signed in late summer 1994 by the Chair of the QST (the Acting
Deputy Administrator). In addition, the Office of Continual Improvement has worked
with the Office of Human Resources and Education in developing and establishing
training courses for enhancing individual expertise in applying TQM concepts. As an
example, a 2-day Joiner Team Training session focusing on a common team framework
for continual improvement teams was presented in May 1994 to the Headquarters CIC
and others.
Although the Panel's report cites specific positive applications of TQM in providing an
assessment of the NASA results, we recognize that continual improvement across the
Agency and its contractors is necessary. We will continue to encourage and practice
continual improvement in all areas to affect the necessary changes.
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APPENDIX C
NASA AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL ACTIVITIES
JANUARY
19
FEBRUARY
3
15
23-25
MARCH
16
22
23
23
24
APRIL
5-7
15
MAY
10
11
17-19
31
JANUARY 1994- JANUARY 1995
Total Quality Management Letter Report to Administrator
Congressional Staff Visit re Panel's Annual Report,
Washington, DC
Panel Review of NASA's Strategic Plan
Review of Multi-Function Electronic Display System/Pilot Assisted
Landing Program; Aircraft Guidance and Navigation Activity; General
Aviation/Commuter Technology; and Human Factors, Ames Research
Center
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Presentation to the Senior Management
Council, NASA Headquarters
Review of Space Station/Russian Programs, NASA Headquarters
Review of Total Quality Management, NASA Headquarters
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Meeting, NASA Headquarters
Review of NASA Safety Programs with Office of Management and
Budget, Washington, DC
STS-59 Mission Activities, Kennedy Space Center
Review of Improved Auxiliary Power Unit, Sundstrand, Rockford, IL
Solid Rocket Motor Review, Thiokol, UT
Filament Wound Case Review, Hercules, Salt Lake City, UT
Reviews of Multi-Function Electronic Display System and Space Station,
Johnson Space Center
lntercenter Aircraft Operations Panel Meeting, E1 Paso, TX
C-1
JUNE
28
29
JULY
I
15
21
AUGUST
2
8
9-10
15-18
17
31
SEPTEMBER
12-13
19
27
Review of Space Shuttle Main Engine Testing, Stennis Space Center
Review of External Tank Programs, Michoud Assembly Facility
Review of Office of Safety and Mission Assurance role in safety
certification; Review of Space Shuttle/Mir Safety; Space Shuttle
reliability discussions with Japanese News Agency, NASA Headquarters
Perseus A Flight Readiness Review, Dryden Flight Research Center
Software Process Action Team Meeting, NASA Headquarters
Perseus B Flight Readiness Review, Dryden Flight Research Center
Discussions with Administrator re Russian safety program; Assured Crew
Return Vehicle policy; ASAP position on Improved Auxiliary Power Unit;
aging aircraft: Solid Rocket Motor nozzle manufacturing: Human Factors
Research, NASA Headquarters
Review of wind shear/wake vortex program; flight deck research/
simulators; aging aircraft; tire wear and crash safety; High-Speed
Research Program; Zero Visibility Landing, Langley Research Center
Review of structured surveillance progress; receipt and handling of
Russian hardware; quality control for European supplied hardware; Space
Station Processing Facility, Kennedy Space Center
Software Process Action Team Meeting, NASA Headquarters
Review of Improved Auxiliary Power Unit, Sundstrand, Rockford, IL
Review of Fire Safety Research; Aircraft Operations; US/Russian Solar
Dynamic Power System; Launch Vehicles; Aeronautics: and Chemical
Rockets. Lewis Research Center
Letter Report to the Administrator, New Gas Generator Valve Module and
Auxiliary Power Unit
Letter Report to the Administrator, Measures of Safety
C-2
OCTOBER
4-5
18
19
2O
NOVEMBER
8-9
9-10
16-17
23
30
DECEMBER
5
WV
14-17
JANUARY
9
18
Integrated Logistics Panel Meeting, New Orleans, LA
Safety Program Review, Dryden Flight Research Center
Space Shuttle Main Engine and Manufacturing Processes and Supplier
Management Reviews, Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, CA
Review of Orbiter return to launch site; tiles; Global Positioning System;
Multi-Function Electronic Display System; and Space Shuttle/Russian
Program, Rockwell, Downey, CA
Integrated Logistics Panel Meeting, Kennedy Space Center
Review of the Space Station Program; Russian Safety Process; Assured
Crew Return Vehicle; and Shuttle/Mir, Johnson Space Center
Review ofTU-144 Program and Shuttle/Mir, NASA Headquarters
Review of Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System,
Rockwell, Downey, CA
Review of the Shuttle/Mir Docking Mechanism, NASA Headquarters
Review of NASA Independent Verification and Validation Lab, Fairmont,
Panel Plenary Session, NASA Headquarters
Review of safety functions, Kennedy Space Center
STS-63 Flight Readiness Review, Kennedy Space Center
C-3

